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ABSTRACT
Manufacturing employment within older, American industrial centers
has been on the decline for years. City and state governments represent-
ing these jurisdictions have responded to this phenomenon by developing
locational incentive programs designed to attract industry. This paper
explores this process from the perspectives of both the "redevelopment"
agency and the firm.
The analytical framework provided by finance theory is applied to val-
ue locational incentives from the firm's perspective. A modelling exercise
based upon this framework demonstrates that it is theoretically possible to
build an incentive program sufficient to overcome the greater costs which
a firm is likely to encounter in constructing and operating a central city
facility vis-a-vis one located in a suburban community , although said
incentive program would have to be of substantial value. This modelling
exercise also indicates that certain combinations of incentive programs --
combinations which could be replicated in today's "real world" given the
incentive offerings of contemporary development organizations -- appear to
be powerful enough to attract industry to urban areas.
The issue of redevelopment agency recognition of the costs of provid-
ing locational incentives to industry is also discussed. Typically, a local
developmern. organization administers the incentive programs, however. Lhe
cost burden is not always borne at the local level since a substantial por-
tion of incentive funding emanates from the Federal government. The rele-
vance of game-theory to the redevelopment process is also discussed,
primarily as involves: 1) the activities of rival redevelopment agencies;
and 2) the interaction of firm and redevelopment agency.
A series of interviews with representatives of firms and redevelopment
organizations which have recently been involved in this process was con-
ducted by the author. Each firm in the interview sample had undertaken a
central city manufacturing project with the assistance of locational incen-
tives. The interviews provide evidence as to those factors which played
a significant role in these firms' location decisions; locational incentives
were not among this set of significant factors. Interviews with repre-
sentatives of redevelopment organizations provide an indication that their
redevelopment strategy is best characterized as a defensive one, depend-
ing (to a great extent) upon the retention of local-firm expansions or
relocations, expending little energy to market their incentive programs to
extra-local firms. The implication is that a sizable fraction of the incen-
tive dollar is expended on firms whose location decisions are not influ-
enced by the receipt of subsidies. The author's recommendations for
redevelopment agency policy revolve around the theme of marketing the
incentive programs to extra-local firms in a more aggressive fashion than
is presently the case.
Thesis Supervisor: Daniel M. Holland
Title: Professor of Finance
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
In the years since World War II, manufacturing employment has been
on the decline within the older central cities. There is evidence of two
general shifts in the locational preferences of manufacturing firms: intra-
regionally to suburban rings outside the older central cities; and, inter-
regionally from the Northeast and Midwest to the West and South. This de-
cline in manufacturing employment within the older central cities has been
attributed to a long list of contributing factors. Hubbell (14) lists the
following factors: technological changes in transportation and communica-
tion which lessen the need for firms to remain in close proximity to mar-
kets and/or suppliers; new production technologies which tend to be land-
intensive; plant/equipment located in the older core cities tends to be
outmoded and hard to maintain; and, political/socioeconomic conditions
are perceived to be more unfavorable in the central cities than in alterna-
tive locations. Hamer (11) adds the high cost and/or general unavailability
of suitable central city sites vis-a"-vis suburban alternatives to the list.
Two important direct effects of this exodus have been observed: high
urban unemployment levels; and, weakened fiscal structures within the
central city. On the fiscal side, some claim "that central cities are caught
in a vicious spiral. "I The point is, the original outmigration of industry
, William H. Oakland, "Local Taxes and Intraurban Industrial Location:
A Survey" in Metropolitan Financing and Growth Management Policies,
(Madison, Wisc., The University of Wisconsin Pres.s, 1978), p. 14.
from a central city translates into a reduction in central city tax revenues.
If the central city responds by increasing the tax burden on remaining
firms, then the result may be an additional outmigration.
In response to this state of affairs, a variety of "reindustrialization"
programs have been developed and implemented by both cities and states
in an attempt to attract fresh industrial projects to their jurisdictions.
Hubbell claims that the re-establishment of a central city industrial base
would have a "multiplier effect upon jobs, reducing welfare and unemploy-
ment costs, and strengthening the tax base of the local community at the
same time..2 There are numerous references within the literature to the
"agglomeration" economies (those benefits resulting from the geographic
concentration of industry) which would result from the re-establishment of
a central city industrial base, which in turn would serve to induce further
redevelopment of the central city. It is also claimed that as previously
unemployed urbanites find new work, income related social costs will
fall (see Hubbell (14)).
It is with such expectations for their effectiveness that city and state
governments have developed locational incentive programs for industry.
Financial incentives have been at the focus of most of these programs to
date, although certain non-financial inducements -- such as development
of central city industrial parks and establishment of training programs for
-L. Kenneth Hubbell, Fiscal Crisis in American Cities: The Federal
Response, (Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Publishing Company, 1979),
p. 293.
local labor -- have recently been adopted with greater frequency by indus-
trial development organizations.
The Issues
Incentive programs of one type or another have been adopted by govern-
ment bodies at all levels -- i.e., Federal, state and local -- and are
employed by such bodies throughout the U.S. (i.e. they are not the exclu-
sive domain of those agencies interested in "reindustrialization"). Given
the exodus from both the central city and the older industrial Northeast and
Midwest, the key issue is whether the availability of industrial develop-
ment incentives will serve to stimulate reindustrialization activity within
these areas. Of interest, therefore, are the weights attached to these in-
centive instruments vis-a'-vis those attached to other locational factors in
the location decision processes of industrial firms.
To facilitate discussion of the relative importance of factors in the
location decision process, this paper will apply a simple classification
scheme which defines three general levels of factor importance, as follows:
- Primary factors are defined to be those which a firm would con-
sider.in its initial screening of candidate regions - localities. A candi-
date which did not meet this minimum standard would not be evaluated
further;
- Secondary factors are defined to be those employed to choose
between specific sites equal in all primary respects;
- Trivial factors are defined to have no impact on site selection.
Of late, a handful of firms whose primary operations and/or head-
quarters are located within the suburban industrial rings encircling Boston
undertook to build plants within the older industrial central city zones of
the city. Each was the recipient of locational incentives. This apparent
beginning of a turnaround in the "flight to the suburbs" motivated this
investigation into the effectiveness of these incentives; an investigation
with a focus on the following:
- the potential dollar value of these incentives to a typical firm
contemplating an investment in manufacturing facilities;
- those specific factors -- quantitative and non-quantitative --
which actually entered into the location decision processes of these par-
ticular suburban-based firms as well as the level of factor importance at
which incentive opportunities entered into these processes;
- the actual development goals and activities of the local develop-
ment organizations involved in this process;
- the financial issues which are relevant from the development
organization's viewpoint;
- those specific factors which enter into the location decision pro-
cesses of firms with existing central city manufacturing facilities in their
decisions to locate additional (new or expanded) facilities there;
- the recent experience of other cities and states which have
implemented industrial redevelopment programs.
Thesis Purpose
The literature on this topic is quite substantial, yet, the phenomenon
appears to be so complex that modelling exercises have experienced limit-
ed success in explaining the location decision process. Virtually no
studies -- either through modelling or survey techniques -- have found
the traditional incentive offerings to have a significant impact on the lo-
cation decision, yet the jurisdictions attempting to induce "reindustriali-
zation" lean heavily on these tools.
The complexity of this topic would indicate that the most valuable
contribution can be made by investigating the above issues from a variety
of perspectives -- theoretical and empirical, quantitative and non-quanti-
tative, firm's and development organization's. This paper will apply the
analytical framework provided by finance theory to value the most popular
incentives from the firm's viewpoint (chapter 2) and to assist in a general
analysis of the financial issues facing the various government bodies
which offer these incentives (chapter 3). From an empirical perspective,
discussion will focus on a number of observations drawn from direct inter-
views conducted by this author with both firm and development entity
personnel who participate in this process (chapter 4). This empirical
work serves to address the issues raised above regarding the actual opera-
tion of this process from the diverse perspectives of urban firm, suburban
firm and development agency. This evidence has been drawn from a number
of distinct communities. Evidence drawn from the literature will also enter
the discussion at this point. It is hoped that some of the results -- pri-
marily those drawn from this author's direct contact with persons making
these decisions -- will shed some light on the operation of the location
decision process and the factors entering into it. This approach serves as
an alternative (or perhaps more properly as a forerunner) to that of the
modelling through hypothesized explanatory factors -- on which much ef-
fort has been expended with little progress to date. A discussion of policy
implications will round out this undertaking (chapter 5). As background
for the discussion to follow, the remainder of this chapter will be devoted
to a description of: the most frequently encountered incentives; and, the
specific offerings available through the jurisdictions studied by this author
-- Boston, Cleveland, State of Michigan.
The Incentives
(a) Financial
The standard financial incentives which have been developed to attract
industry are: concessionary (below market interest rate) loans; loan guar-
antees; property-tax holidays; and, industrial revenue bonds (IRB's). The
incentives are provided by a wide variety of government bodies, and in
some cases incentive funds may flow through a series of development org-
anizations prior to reaching the subsidized firm (e.g., from Federal to
local). Furthermore, some of these instruments are not offered solely by
redevelopment organizations. For example, tax concessions may be offered
by a suburb in its efforts to attract industry. The unique feature offered by
redevelopment organizations is that they provide access to a broad selec-
tion of incentive instruments, including those which are unique to redevel-
opment efforts as well as those available generally. Finally, it is not
unusual for the issuing bodies to place limitations on the uses to which
each instrument may be put.
A brief description of each follows:
- Loan Guarantees: Loan guarantees are provided by a development
entity -- usually a Federal government body such as the Small Business
Administration (SBA) or the Economic Development Administration (EDA) of
the Department of Commerce -- to a private lender who funds some portion
(typically not to exceed 90%) of project costs. Typically, the local devel-
opment company (LDC) and the subsidized firm then advance the remainder
of the capital required to fund the project. (Interestingly enough, the LDC's
are usually capitalized with grants from a federal body -- EDA for example).
The Federal entity and the private lender have the senior position with re-
spect to the debt and the LDC a subordinate position. The SBA (502) pro-
gram limits the size of both firm and loan which will be serviced by it.
Funds involved in an SBA (502) agreement can be applied to buy land, mach-
inery or equipment and to construct, modernize or convert plants. They may
have terms of up-to 25 years. The funds cannot be used for working capital
or debt repayment. The private lender can charge no more than 1/2% over
prime. The SBA (7a) program can be applied to finance working capital for
a term of up to seven years; fixed assets up to twenty years. The EDA
(Business Development Loan Program Title II) provides guarantees on loans
which exceed the SBA maximum and cover either capital improvements (up
to 25 years) or working capital (up to 7 years). In sum, therefore, the
private lending institution is essentially offered corporate debt which is
as safe as a Treasury Bill since most of the guarantees emanate from a
Federal agency, even if formally passing through a local "intermediary",
(i.e., it is effectively riskless). In effect, the government has taken on
the default risk of the debt. Finally, note that the SBA programs are not
restricted to redevelopment efforts. The SBA restrictions involve firm size
for the most part. In contrast, the EDA programs are targeted to assist
areas of "economic distress".
- Concessionary Loans: The local development agency may orche-
strate the placement of direct loans from Federal bodies to private firms or
may use funds provided to it through a Federal grant to make a direct loan
on its own. An Economic Development Grant (EDA Title IX) provides funds
to a state or city entity to be dispersed to other public or private entities
in the form of concessionary loans (or in some cases loan guarantees).
Other Federally-based programs (the same EDA and SBA programs discussed
in the loan guarantee section) typically require that a private lender, the
LDC and the subsidized firm advance approximately 70% of the project fund-
ing, with the remainder to come from the Federal entity at a below market
rate which varies over time as market conditions change. The direct in-
vestment by the Federal agencies -- especially the EDA.-- is restricted to
firms whose location in a "distressed" area will provide employment and
other economic benefits. This type of loan effectively provides the recipient
firm with an interest liability on its debt less than that which a "market"
loan would place on the firm. Another Federal body -- the U.S. Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development -- offers Urban Development
Action Grants (UJDAG's) to local development organizations with the restric-
tion that the grants be employed for projects which will create jobs and
improve the tax base of "distressed" cities. There must be a definite
commitment on the part of the private sector to fund the project since the
UDAG money cannot account for more than 25% of total project cost. These
funds may be used for: low interest business loans for industrial facili-
ties; acquisition of land; and infrastructure improvements (e.g., water or
sewer lines and access roads). Here again, availability of SBA funds is
not limited to redevelopment activities, whereas the EDA and UDAG funds
are designed to provide assistance to "economically distressed" communi-
ties.
- Industrial Revenue Bonds (IRB's): Although a local entity issues
these tax-exempt instruments, in general only the recipient firm is obligat-
ed to make principal and interest repayments. The uses to which the IRB
funds may be put are typically limited in some way. For example, a Boston
redevelopment authority reserves the use of IRB's "for construction, acqui-
sition, equipping or improvement '" 3 of facilities. They cannot be issued
for refinancing or for working capital. Effectively, these instruments pro-
vide a firm with an interest liability on its debt less than that which it
faces in the conventional debt markets. In general, the various financial
3Economic Development and Industrial Corporation of Boston, Finan-
cial Assistance Programs, (Boston, Mass., April, 1980), p. 16.
agreements may be structured so as to place any interest and/or deprecia-
tion deductions with either the IRB-issuing body or the recipient firm.
Very heavily used in the 1960's, the IRS (in 1968) placed severe restric-
tions on the dollar amount of tax-exempt issues which could be floated by
a single community for one firm within a specific time-frame. At present,
the restrictions are as follows: if the IRB issue is over $1 million (up to
a limit of $10 million), the total capital expenditures by the recipient firm
within the community of issue cannot exceed $10 million over the time span
covering the three years before and three years after the issue date; for
issues of less than $1 million, no restrictions of this sort apply; issues for
pollution control facilities are unlimited; for projects involving a UDAG,
the capital expenditure ceiling is raised to $20 million. Note that the is-
sue of IRB's is not restricted to development activities, although a common
requirement is that there be evidence showing that the subsidized project
will serve the "public purpose". Public purpose "may include job creation
and/or retention, tax revenue generation, or area revitalization among
other possibilities. "4
- Property tax holidays: Many development entities, through a
variety of mechanisms, have the ability to significantly reduce the proper-
ty tax burden on a firm for some period of time. The programs range from
ad hoc deals on a firm by firm basis to very well-defined programs enacted
into law. For example, one of the more well-defined methods involves the
4 Economic Development and Industrial Corporation of Boston, The Bos-
ton Industrial Revenue Bond Program, (Boston, Mass.), p. 9.
freezing of the assessed value of a piece of obsolete property upon which
improvements are to be made. One variation on this theme for new or re-
placement property is to simply cut the millage rate by some substantial
percentage. In cases in which local development agencies purchase, im-
prove and then lease property to firms, an in lieu of property tax payment
may be negotiated. Similarly, in cases in which IRB's are used, an in lieu
of property tax payment may be negotiated between the issuing body and
the firm which effectively is leasing the IRB-funded facilities from the
issuer. Clearly, property tax concessions are not an exclusive instrument
of communities involved in a redevelopment effort.
(b) Non-Financial Incentives
The development organizations studied by this author complemented
their financial incentive offerings with a variety of non-financial incent-
ive programs, including: the acquisition, clearance and improvement of
central city land by the development agency which then either leased or
sold the land to a firm on favorable terms (the key advantage in this in-
stance is that the development organization is able to exercise its right of
eminent domain to assemble a parcel of land sufficient to accommodate a
modern, industrial undertaking), the purchase and renovation, by a devel-
opment organization, of obsolete central city structures so as to provide
a supply of modern, competitively-priced, central city manufacturing
space; training programs operated by a development organization provid-
ing instruction to local labor in skills commensurate with the needs of
central city firms; and, various real estate and research services. In the
case of training programs, a Federal grant may be utilized for funding.
Typically, firms are able to gain access to this trained labor pool by prom-
ising to provide the program administrators with advance notice with
respect to new openings. In the case of land assembly/improvement and
building renovation programs, the local development organization may ob-
tain funding by issuing general obligation bonds or by applying for Federal
grants. The firms which ultimately occupy these properties typically are
extended a lease with favorable terms, however, in the case of improved
land the development organization may sell the land to a firm outright.
The Development Organizations
Interviews with development agency personnel representing three
separate jurisdictions -- Boston, Cleveland and the State of Michigan --
were conducted by this author. Additionally, various publications con-
taining information pertaining to the activities of these development org-
anizations were collected. Interestingly, each development organization
seems to be at a different stage in the development of its "reindustrializa-
tion" approach, with that of the State of Michigan being the oldest and
most polished, Boston's next and Cleveland's last.
The office of Economic Development of Michigan's Department of Com-
merce has been in existence for thirty years. Its purpose is to encourage
industrial growth. The key incentive program offered by the state is a tax
program adopted in 1974 specifically designed to induce the renovation/
expansion of older plant and the construction of new plant in Michigan.
Specifically, the program permits a 12 year freeze on the property tax as-
sessed against an obsolete, (but-to-be-improved) facility. For new or
replacement facilities, a 12 year tax break equivalent to 50% of the mill-
age rate is available. The tax benefits are formally granted by the local
government desiring to use such measures to attract industry. Note that
this tax benefit is not just available to new firms entering the state for
the first time, but is available to all firms which are expanding, rehabili-
tating or relocating plant within the state. Also available to firms locating
within the state is a broad assortment of Federally-based programs (SBA
(502), SBA (7a), EDA Title II and IX; and HUD UDAG funds). IRB's are also
available and may be issued by the LDC's. There also exists a Michigan
entity which will make direct loans and loan guarantees to industrial firms.
In the area of non-financial offerings, the Office of Economic Development
provides very detailed information on industrial sites available throughout
the state as well as general information regarding the economic character-
istics of the state (e.g. labor, natural resources, energy, etc.). Very
detailed publications are distributed to firms outlining the locational in-
centives available within the state. Furthermore, a salesforce of "indus-
trial representatives" actively markets specific facilities (through the use
of individualized presentations) to firms which the representatives feel
might find the facilities to be of particular interest. The site information
presented to these firms is extensive and describes: geographic location
of facility, land area, building, utilities, transportation, local education-
al facilities, municipal services, local financial institutions and so on.
Boston is not short on development entities. The key public agencies
are the Economic Development and Industrial Corporation (EDIC) and the
Boston Redevelopment Authority. Private development organizations also
exist, representing specific communities. Financial incentive programs
include: SBA (502), SBA (7a); EDA programs; IRB's; UDAG's and some funds
through a Boston LDC established by the EDIC. The key in the non-finan-
cial area is the recent development of three industrial parks: a 102-acre
ex-Navy facility (the closing of which in 1974 caused the loss of 6,000
permanent blue-collar jobs); 7.5 acres of open land which has been im-
proved and zoned to accommodate light industry; a 38 acre development in
five parcels which became available when plans for a highway extension
were cancelled. Many small firms (less than 100 employees) and a few
larger firms have located within these parks to date. The EDIC also oper-
ates a job training center and offers a real estate search service. The
industrial parks were financed with EDA and UDAG grants. The job train-
ing center was similarly financed.
The following is an example of the flexibility and complexity with
which these incentives can be combined. This example involves a major
undertaking within Boston, the financial package for which was finalized
in 1980. The plans are for a 166,000 square foot facility on 7.5 acres of
land to be located within one of the city's industrial parks. A variety of
financial instruments were applied as follows:
- $175,000 in general obligation bonds issued by EDIC/City of
Boston for site acquisition;
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- $1, 585,000 of UDAG funds for site acquisition and preparation,
issued to the EDIC;
- $1, 500,000 of EDA Title IX funds for building construction issued
to a private, community-based economic development organization through
the EDIC;
- $4,750, 000 of IRB funds purchased by a commercial bank for
building construction, repayment of which will be the responsibility of the
subsidized firm and the community-based organization.
A 25 year lease-purchase agreement was also negotiated which in-
cludes: rental payments to each of the development entities; an in lieu
of property tax payment (since the city owns the property) which reflects
an implicit rate of less than the regular property tax rate; a payback sched-
ule for the general obligation funding with interest payments deferred to
years 11-25; a purchase option; and, a goal for the employment of Boston
res idents.
Cleveland also has its share of development entities: one at the city
level; another at the county level; an entity similar to a Chamber of Com-
merce which is involved in development work; and, community-based devel-
opment groups. *UDAG, EDA, tax-concessions and IRB funds are available.
The primary financial tools used by Cleveland development groups are
UDAG's and IRB's (which are used in practically every instance). In the
area of non-financial activity, the city has recently undertaken to develop
an industrial park. (Plans for its first tenant fell through, however, when
this firm found an existing facility elsewhere within the city which met
its needs precisely.)
Having summarized the issues involved in the study of this topic, the
various "tools of the trade", the participants, and having provided an in-
dication -- through use of a "real world" example -- of how all of this may
come together for one project, we turn in the next chapter to the evaluation
of incentives by the firm.
CHAPTER 2
Firm Evaluation of Incentives
The purpose of this chapter is to apply some of the tools of modern
finance theory to evaluate -- from the perspective of the firm -- the poten-
tial financial impact of the various incentive instruments outlined in the
preceding chapter. To do so, a model for valuation of projects which uti-
lize conventional financial instruments (base-case) will be established,
followed by a discussion of the net impact on this base-case of each in-
centive instrument.
The Base-Case
In ascertaining the relative value of alternative locations -- whether
in an urban/suburban or an inter-regional comparison -- a base-case (con-
ventional financing) analysis of each site would be the likely first step in
the evaluation process. As its analytical framework, this chapter will ap-
ply the adjusted-present-value (APV) technique of project valuation. The
APV technique estimates a project's value assuming all equity financing,
then adjusts this figure for side-effects attributable to changes in the fin-
ancing assumptions (e.g., introduction of debt). The technique is based
upon the calculation of the present value of the various cash flows which
transpire in the course of normal operations. The technique explicitly
accounts for inflation (i.e. discounting real and nominal flows appropriate-
ly) and the different levels of risk which distinct cash flows may represent.
For purposes of this chapter, it is assumed that the base-case project will
include some debt financing. The literature does contain some similar
analysis (Hellman, Wassail and Falk (12) and Hubbell (14)), based upon
different analytical frameworks (note: to my knowledge, none have applied
APV to this area). These studies typically: do not distinguish between
real and nominal flows; discount all flows by a single rate usually equal
to the firm's cost of debt; and, assume that projects are 100% debt fin-
anced. The APV technique provides for a more realistic modelling of each
of these areas.
The model for a conventionally financed project is as follows:
N (RJ-OPj)(1-T) N T.DEPj N T*IMj N IMj+Pj
V=-Co+ + + Lo-
j=1 (l+ra)J j=1 (1+ra)j j=1 (1+Ri) j  j=1 (1+Ri)j
where:
- V = project present value;
- Rj =revenue in period j (real terms);
- OPJ =operating flows in period j (real terms) exclusive of
depreciation;
- DEPJ =depreciation flows in period j (real terms);
- IMj = loan interest payment on debt sold through conventional
market channels in period j (nominal terms);
- Pj = loan principal repayment in period j (nominal terms);
- Co = total project cost in period O;
- Lo = loan receipt in period O;
- T =tax rate (combined state and Federal);
- ra =the project's real opportunity cost of capital which is a
function of the project's business risks;
- Ri = the nominal rate of interest on debt sold through conven-
tional market channels;
- N = project life.
In effect, the first three terms (from the left) are the value of the pro-
ject if all equity financed. The real net annual operating flows (the second
term) are discounted by the real opportunity cost of capital for this project.
The third term is the value of real depreciation tax shields and are also
discounted at the project's real opportunity cost of capital (note: since
the depreciation flows are nominal by definition, they would first have to
be discounted by the inflation rate to set them in real terms). There is
some question as to which discount rate is appropriate to apply to these
depreciable flows, however, the use of ra reflects the assumption that the
market accounts for these flows in its valuation of the project. The fourth
term is the value of the interest tax shields discounted at the market in-
terest rate on this debt since the "common assumption is that the risk of
the tax shields is the same as that of the interest payments generating
them. "I The last two terms are added for completeness. If the debt is
priced fairly -- as is assumed here -- these two terms will be equivalent
and thus cancel. Further refinement could be made to the model (such as
IRichard Brealey and Stewart Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance,
(McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1981), p. 374.
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Investment Tax Credits (ITC's)), however, it is assumed that such items
would be available irrespective of locational choice.
By applying the above formula, a firm would be able to calculate the
relative worth of a variety of locations and (excluding the availability of
incentives for the moment) select an optimal site (optimal in the sense
that the firm is attempting to maximize its value as defined by the above
assortment of quantifiable factors). The implicit assumption underlying
the use of financial incentives by development organizations is that the
urban/suburban location comparison will conclude unfavorably for the ur-
ban site. Hamer (10) has studied this topic in detail and his estimates of
operating cost differentials form the basis for a hypothetical application of
this model at the end of this chapter.
Valuing Incentive Instruments
A discussion of the impact of each of the four major types of incentive
instruments described in the previous chapter is presented below:
(a) Concessionary Loans
Concessionary loans act to reduce the interest liability which a firm
must assume relative to an issue of debt sold in a standard market trans-
action. To calculate the value of a concessionary loan -- relative to the
base-case -- requires only a few changes in the above formulation. The
last term in the base-case formula will change since the annual interest
liability with a concessionary loan (ICj) will be less than the interest lia-
bility from the base-case (IMj). Hence, the firm will now be in a position
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N ICJ + Pj
where Lo > . Therefore these last two terms in the formula
j=1 (1 + Ri)j
will not cancel as they did in the base-case and a positive increment to
value will result. That is, the present value of the interest and principal
payments over the term of the loan, discounted at the interest rate the
firm would pay on the base-case loan 2 (i.e. debt with no subsidy), will
be less than the cash received from the loan at the start of the project.
The advantage of the APV technique is that it isolates the increment to
total project value attributable to the interest tax shields. That is, with
the lesser interest payments (i.e. IMj >ICj), the value of the interest tax
shield is reduced. Although in net the subsidy is still positive, a certain
amount of the interest tax shields -- which have a positive impact on the
cash flow of the firm -- have been lost relative to the base-case, hence,
the subsidy is worth somewhat less than that represented by the amount of
the interest rate spread between the market and concessionary rates. The
formula now looks as follows:
N (Rj-OPj)(1-T) N T.DEPj N T*ICj N ICj+Pj
V=-Co+ . + . + + - + Lo- -.
j=l (l+ra)J j=l (l+ra)J j=1 (l+Ri)J j=l (1+Ri) j
With this adjustment to the base-case formulation, the value of a subsi-
dized urban project can be ascertained and compared with a. convention-
ally financed suburban case. Working backwards, the concessionary rate
of interest required to make the firm indifferent between locations can be
2 Brealey and Myers, p. 402.-
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"forced" from the difference in the project values calculated for unsubsi-
dized urban and suburban sites.
(b) Loan Guarantees
For purposes of this discussion it will be assumed that the loan guar-
antee emanates from a Federal government body; hence, the further assump-
tion will be made that the private lending institution faces no risk of
default. Given this, the firm should be able to negotiate a loan from the
private lender at a rate in the vicinity of that paid on riskless government
debt (i.e. Treasury Bills). Hence, in effect, the firm which is provided
with a Federal government guarantee is able to sell its debt such that its
interest liability is less than that which the firm would assume through a
conventional (i.e. unsubsidized) debt issue. Interestingly enough, this
state of affairs -- from the firm's viewpoint -- looks quite like that of a
concessionary loan. That is, the annual interest liability of the guaran-
teed debt (IGj) is less than that of the base-case (IMj). Therefore, in a
N IGj + Pj
parallel result to the concessionary loan case, Lo>) . The
j=O (1 + Ri) j
value of the guarantee, therefore, is that attributable to this resultant
interest rate spread (between guaranteed and market rates), although once
again, the value of lost interest tax shields vis-a'-vis the base-case must
be accounted for. The model now looks as follows:
N (RJ-OPj)(1-T) N T'DEPj N T-IGj N IGj+Pj
V=-Co+( + + + - Lo- -
j=1 (l+ra)J j=l (l+ra)J j=1 (l+Ri)j j=1 (1+Ri)j
An interesting aspect of these guarantees concerns the interest rate
which the subsidized firm is able to negotiate once the guarantee has been
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obtained. Theoretically, this rate should be the risk free rate, though
frequently it exceeds that rate (e.g. as discussed above, the SBA allows
the private lender to charge up to 1/2% more than prime in transactions of
this sort). Furthermore, the subsidized firms may be charged a percentage
point or two by the issuing government agency for this guarantee provi-
sion. From the firm's perspective, therefore, if both concessionary loans
and loan guarantees are available, a comparison of the effective interest
rates represented by each instrument (including any fees in the case of a
guarantee) can be made and a selection made accordingly. Clearly, the
prime consideration is whether a subsidy would be available large enough
to make the firm indifferent between the urban and suburban sites.
(c) Property Tax Holidays
Implicit within the OPj term of the base-case formulation is the real
value of property taxes assessed in each year of the project's life. In
this instance a cut in property taxes will not result in an increase in pro-
ject value equivalent to the full amount of the tax subsidy. This is due to
the fact that these property taxes are typically deductible in the computa-
tion of taxable income at the state and federal level. Hence, as OPj drops
by the value of the cut in property taxes relative to that of the base-case
(call this positive quantity & PTJ), the value of the project will increase
m APTJ (1-T)
by ( where m is the number of years over which the tax
j=O (I + ra)J
holiday is in effect. This sum can simply be added to the urban base-
case result for comparison with a suburban case and a selection made
accordingly.
(d) Industrial Revenue Bonds
This case is actually the most interesting of all since the structure
of project financing may be arranged in a couple of alternative fashions --
usually at the option of the subsidized firm. Typically, the funds assem-
bled through issue of an IRB flow to the local government which formally
acquires or constructs the facility, which is then leased to the user firm.
The flexibility derives from the structuring of this lease agreement. IRS
regulations also have an impact here. Namely, if there is some indica-
tion that the lease is effectively a debt instrument (such an indication
would be a lease clause which permits the lessee to purchase the facility
for some trivial amount at the end of the lease) then the lessee must fin-
ancially treat the facility as its property (i.e. lessee takes depreciation,
not lessor). If there is no such indication, the lessor takes the deprecia-
tion and the lessee deducts the lease payments from its taxes. (See
Stober and Falk (49) for a detailed analysis of this topic.) From this, the
key items for consideration by the lessee are as follows:
- the percentage of project cost financed through the IRB (i.e.
this percentage may be more than, equal to, or less than that were the
project financed through conventional debt channels);
- the potential loss of interest and depreciation tax shields;
- the value of lease payment tax shields;
- the availability of property tax concessions.
One alternative lease structure (which is that typically adopted in
Boston arrangements of this sort) involves the effective transfer of title
to the lessee, who is directly accountable for repayment of the IRB (mak-
ing interest and principal repayments directly to the private lender). Fur-
thermore, this structure enables the lessee to take advantage of the
depreciation and interest tax shields. Alteration of the base-case formu-
lation is minimal in this case since the only adjustment involves the
substitution of the reduced annual interest payment liability on the IRB
(call it IBj) for the base-case market liability (IMj). This case is there-
fore exactly equivalent in formulation to the concessionary loan case
(given normal market conditions in which tax-exempt rates are less than
corporate debt rates) since the firm experiences a reduction in the rate
of interest which it must pay to the holders of its debt relative to con-
ventional debt financing. Furthermore, there is no loss of depreciation or
interest tax shields.
In situations in which the development organization retains title to
the facility, the lessee makes regular lease payments which typically
cover the costs of the bond issue exactly, thereby passing the savings
attributable to tax-exemption on to the lessee. Furthermore, the lessee
may not be required to make in lieu of tax payments for its use of the local
government's property. The lease payments are tax deductible, thereby
creating a tax shield. Such a lease structure does not permit the lessee
to use the depreciation tax shields. Interest tax shields will also be lost
relative to the base-case with debt financing. The adjustments to the
base-case formulation which this lease structure requires are somewhat
involved. Since the IRB displaces base-case debt, interest tax shields
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are lost. (Note: Brealey and Myers introduce the concept of the "equiva-
lent loan" to value the cash flows resulting from financial leases and
point out that in the APV framework the value of the lease is reduced by
the loss of interest tax shields which the debt would provide. 3) Part of
the depreciation shield will similarly evaporate since the lessor will have
claim to it, (note, some will remain with the lessee since it is assumed
that the firm has taken some equity position in the project, as is reason-
N LPj N T*LPj
able). Two new terms appear: - _ + ( (where LPj
j=1 (I + Ri) j=l1 (1 +Ri)]
is the lease payment). The first term represents the present value of the
stream of lease payments. The second term represents the present value
of the tax shields so generated. If a property tax exemption is also avail-
able, OPJ will fall relative to the base-case. For purposes of this paper,
discussion of the "equivalent loan" concept has been limited since this
specific lease structure appears to have less appeal to firms utilizing
IRB's due to the absolute loss of the depreciation and interest tax shields.
That is, from information gathered through interviews conducted by this
author, the first alternative lease structure -- i.e. transfer of deductible
flows to lessee -- has proven more attractive to firms making this deci-
sion, as appears reasonable due to the tax shield effects. One interview-
ee -- whose firm was still involved in negotiating an incentive package at
the time of interview -- noted that it made no sense to waste the tax
shields through transfer to a local development organization which would
be unable to apply them.
4 Brealey and Myers, p. 534.
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The IRS restrictions on the use of tax-exempt bond issues to finance
private sector projects have substantially reduced the viability of IRB's
as financial incentive vehicles. Hellman et al. (12) provide an indication
of the extent to which these restrictions (described in chapter 1) have im-
pacted the IRB market. For example, their estimate of the volume of IRB
financing in 1968 is $1.6 billion and of the size of the average IRB issue
is $8.52 million, while the 1974 estimates (the IRS restrictions were im-
posed in the late 1960's) for these parameters are $.493 billion and $1.8
million respectively (all in nominal terms). One can infer that firms under-
taking either one large project or a series of smaller projects in rapid
succession would be the most likely to find that their capital needs ex-
ceeded the IRS ceilings, and the attractiveness of IRB financing reduced
accordingly.
Finally, IRB financing is not an incentive instrument reserved for the
exclusive use of redevelopmernt organizations. The "real world" example
presented at the end of this chapter demonstrates that suburban communi-
ties may compete with central cities for industry by providing IRB incen-
tives of their own.
(e) Non-Financial Incentives
The base-case APV formulation developed above can also be applied
to value non-financial incentives. Specifically, the provision of work-
force training by a development agency would reduce a firm's OPj term,
primarily through lessened training expense (although recruiting costs
might be reduced as well if general searches of the labor force for quali-
flied employees were made unnecessary). As discussed in the previous
chapter, the firm typically incurs no direct costs for utilizing these train-
ing services.
In the case of development agency acquisition and improvement of
land, the "Co" term would be reduced since firm expenditures on these
items at the time of project start-up (period O) would no longer be required.
The typical arrangement is for the development agency to receive Federal
government grants to cover the costs of these projects. The development
agency may then either sell the property to the firm for an amount suffi-
cient to cover some fraction of its costs (e.g. acquisition costs only) or
may lease the property to the firm at an attractive rate which reflects an
implicit in lieu of property tax payment. The key point is that the firm
does not reimburse the development agency for the total costs of land
acquisition/improvement.
A Hypothetical Application
In an effort to ascertain the potential financial impact of these in-
centives, this section will explore the relative strengths of the various
incentive programs through application of the analytical framework devel-
oped above to hypothetical urban and suburban projects. Parameter esti-
mates for the urban and suburban sites were made through reference to both
Hamer's study of comparative costs of urban and suburban location (10) and
to information gathered through the interview process. These parameter
estimates are as follows (dollars in thousands):
Table 1 -- Parameter Estimates, Hypothetical Exercise
Parameter
T (Tax Rate). . .
Co-land cost ..
-bldg. cost .
-equip. cost .
Property tax rate
N (project life)
Inflation rate .
R) (revenue). .
Operating flows
-labor .
-materials .
-overhead .
-selling and
mktg......
-general admin
Urban Site
... . 50%
. $ 300
... $ 1, 520(2 stories)
.$1,000
5%
. . 25 years
... . 10%
. . .$5, 000/year
. . . $1,295/year
. $1, 250/year
S. . $ 700/year
.... $ 600/year
.... $ 400/year
Suburban Site
50%
$ 225
$ 1, 200(1 story)
$ , 000
3%
25 years
10%
$5, 000/year
$ 1, 400/year
$ 1, 250/year
$ 550/year
$ 600/year
$ 400/year
re (real capital cost) . . 7% 7%
Ri (interest rate)' . . . . 12% 12%
Depreciation method . .sum-of-the-years same
digits
Lo (loan) ..... . .$1,400 $1,400
These estimates were formulated as follows:
- since the aim is to model manufacturing projects, it is assumed
that RJ is invariant with location;
- re , Ri and the inflation rate reflect contemporary.market condi-
tions as well as the findings of Ibbotson and Sinquefield (15) on the histor-
ical returns on equity and debt;
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- it was assumed that the firm would utilize accelerated depre-
ciation in its valuation practice since it serves to increase the present
value of the depreciable flows vis-9-vis the straight line method;
- operating cost estimates were made for the suburban site as
follows: - labor costs equal 28% of revenue;
- material costs equal 25% of revenue;
- overhead costs (inclusive of property
taxes) equal 11% of revenue;
- selling and mktg. costs equal 12% of revenue;
- general admin. costs equal 8% of revenue;
- operating cost estimates for the urban site are equivalent to those
made for the suburban site with the following exceptions:
- labor costs are 7.5% less than in the suburbs;
- overhead costs (inclusive of property taxes)
equal 14% of revenue. (Note: beyond the higher
urban property tax costs, it was assumed that
overhead costs would be about 15% higher at the
urban site due to differential inefficiencies such
as time-motion problems attributable to operating
within a multi-story structure and so on.)
These estimates of operating costs were made through reference to Hamer's
research (10) in this area and to firm-specific information gathered through
this author's interviewing endeavors;
- again through reference to Hamer's work, it was assumed that
the urban facility would be two stories with a ground-floor-space-to-
total-land-area ratio of 50%, and that the suburban facility would be a
single story affair with a building-space-to-total-land-area ratio of 33%.
It was assumed that both structures would be of 50, 000 square feet and
that urban construction costs would exceed suburban costs by 26.7%(i.e.
$30.4persquare foot for the urban facility and $24 per square foot for the
suburban -- again per Hamer). Equipment costs were assumed to be in-
variant with location. The relative magnitudes of these investments in
property, plant and equipment correspond to those characterizing the spe-
cific projects studied directly by this author;
- it is assumed that all relevant "lives" (e.g. project, loan, and
depreciation) are 25 years;
- the loan is assumed to be a 25 year discount affair with con-
stant nominal interest payments for 25 years and a "balloon" interest and
principal payment in year 25. It was assumed that approximately 50% of
"Co" would be debt financed;
- the property tax rate estimates reflect research done by both
Hamer and myself and apply to land, building and equipment.
- it was also assumed that land costs per square foot for the ur-
ban and suburban communities are $6.00 and $1.50 respectively. Two-
thirds of the urban land cost per square foot ($4.00) is required to cover
land clearance and improvement costs. These estimates are based on act-
ual projects recently undertaken in the Boston area.
Using these parameter estimates, the formulation developed above
was first applied to ascertain the net present value of each project (i.e.
site) with no urban incentive assumptions (i.e. the "base-case") and then
to estimate the net present value of the urban project under a broad range
of incentive assumptions. The following is a description of the incentive
assumptions made for purposes of this example:
Table 2 -- Definition of Assumptions, Hypothetical Exercise
As sumption # Description
I - a property tax rate of 1.25% to apply for
all 25 years.
2 - a property tax rate of 2.5% to apply for
the project's first 12 years, 5% there-
after. (Note: this assumption was
modelled after Michigan's tax incentive
program.)
3 - a property tax rate of 2.5% to apply for
all 25 years.
4 - a property tax rate of 0% to apply for
the project's first 14 years, 5% thereafter.
5 - development agency acquires, clears
and improves land. Firm pays only for
acquisition costs (assumed to be $2.00
per square foot as described above) and
pays property tax only on this amount
(i.e. on $100,000 acquisition cost).
6 - the combination of assumptions 3 and 5.
7 - no urban labor cost differential. (Note:
this is actually a variation on the base-
case rather than an incentive assumption).
8 - through a labor training program offered
by the development agency, the firm is
able to realize a 10% labor cost saving in
the city vis-a-vis the suburb. The impli-
cit assumption is that such a program would
reduce the firm's training costs.
9 - same as 8, yet a 12.5% differential is
achieved.
10 - the combination of assumptions 3 and 8.
11 - the combination of assumptions 2, 5 and 8.
- firm does not purchase the property from
the city but does pay an annual rent of
$1.75 per square foot of land area which
also includes' an in lieu of tax payment
covering all tax liability (i.e. land,
building and equipment).
- a concessionary rate of 6% on the debt
(i.e. Ri = .06).
- Ri = 0%.
- Ri = 1%.
- Ri = 9%.
- the combination of assumptions 5 and 13.
- the combination of assumptions 2 and 13.
- the combination
16.
of assumptions 2, 5 and
10 - the combination of assumptions 2, 8 and
16.
- Lo = $2,000,000 and a concessionary
rate of 4% (i.e. Ri = .04).
The results are as follows:
Table 3 -- Results, Hypothetical Exercise
Assumption 4 NPV of Urban Site
Amount by which
Suburban base-case
NPV ($3,270,700)
exceeds Urban case
NPV under varying
assumptions
base-case (i.e.
no urban incentives)
1
2
3
4
5
$2,667,700
3,280,700
2,946,700
3,075,700
3,284,700
2,923,700
2
4
+
+
+
603,000
10,000
324,000
195,000
14,000
347,000
mm m m " m mmm • i
Amount by which
Suburban base-case
NPV ($3,270,700)
exceeds Urban case
NPV under varying
Assumption # NPV of Urban Site assumptions
6 $3,304,700 -$ 34,000
7 2,052,700 + 1,218,000
8 2,868,700 + 402,000
9 3,072,700 + .198,000
10 3,279,700 - 9,000
11 3,387,700 - 117,000
12 3,275,700 - 5,000
13 2,996,700 + 274,000
14 3,326,700 - 56,000
15 3,271,700 - 1, 000
16 2,832,700 + 438,000
17 3,252,700 + 18,000
18 3,275,700 - 5,000
19 3,349,700 - 79,000
20 3,311,700 - 41,000
21 3,576,700 - 24,000 (Note:
in this case, the
Suburban NPV is
$3,552,700 due to
the assumption that
debt amounts at
both sites would be
same, hence, the
Suburban NPV goes
up due to the in-
creased tax shields
resulting from the
increase in debt at
both sites.)
The base-case result shows that the suburban site possesses an
$603,000 advantage over an unsubsidized urban site. Therefore, any in-
centive program must overcome this differential in order to attract the firm
to the urban site. Assumptions 1 - 4 concern adjustments in property tax
liabilities. Note that either a 75% cut in property tax liability (assumption
#1) or a total holiday for 14 years with a standard payment thereafter (as-
sumption #4) would overcome the differential. However, a 50% cut for 12
years (the Michigan model) only eliminates 46% of the differential and its
extension to apply for the life of the project (assumption #3) still leaves
a differential of $195, 000.
Assumption #5 covers the "non-financial" land acquisition, clearance
and improvement program and is modelled after a specific case encoun-
tered during the course of this research. The results show that a $347, 000
differential would remain were this program applied to the urban site.
Assumption #6 involves the combination of the land acquisition/improve-
ment program with a tax holiday program of more than average generosity
(assumption #3). The result is that the differential is overcome with
$34,000 to spare.
Assumptions 7 - 12 cover the potential impact of a labor cost differ-
ential and free labor training programs. To provide some indication of the
value of the base-case assumption that the firm would realize a 7.5%
labor cost saving in the urban location, assumption #7 (i.e. no labor cost
differential) was included in this set. The result shows that, were the
urban community not able to offer a labor cost advantage of this magni-
tude, the cost differential between city and suburb would more than double.
Assumption #'s 8 and 9 explore the value of further reductions in urban
labor costs derived through provision of free labor training, with the re-
sult that in either case a substantial differential remains. Assumption #10
models the effect of a combination of a tax holiday program of more than
average generosity (assumption #3) and a labor training program which
cuts urban labor costs another 2.5% beyond the original assumption of a
7.5% gap (assumption #8). The result is that the urban site just becomes
more valuable than the suburban. Assumption #11 models a package of in-
centives which includes a Michigan type tax program (assumption #2), a
land acquisition/improvement package (assumption #5) and a training
program (assumption #8). This program, with some negotiation, probably
could be provided by a local development agency today. As the results
show, this package overcomes the differential with plenty of room to
spare (i.e. $117,000). Assumption #12 is also interesting since it was
also modelled after one of the specific arrangements encountered in the
course of this research. As the result shows, this is a very powerful
incentive since it overcomes the differential on its own. In effect, this
incentive amounts to giving the improved land to the firm and cutting its
total tax liability by about 40% for the entire life of the project.
Assumptions 13 - 20 explore the potential impact of the incentives
which work through a reduction in the effective interest rate on a firm's
debt (i.e. concessionary loans, loan guarantees and IRB's). Assumptions
13 - 16 explore the impact of interest rate concessions offered as the sole
incentive. As the results show, with an assumption of a 50% contribu-
tion of debt to project financing, the interest rate on the $1, 400, 000 of
debt must be reduced from 12% to 1% to overcome the differential. Assump-
tion 17 models an incentive package of a concessionary loan extended at
50% of the market rate (probably an unusually generous concession by
contemporary standards) in conjunction with the land acquisition/improve-
ment program. The combination comes just short of eliminating the entire
differential and a 5% concessionary rate would provide just enough incre-
mental incentive to do so. Assumption #18 combines a Michigan type tax
program with a concessionary loan of what is probably somewhat more
generous than the norm. The result shows that this package is just suffi-
cient to overcome the differential. Assumption 019 combines a Michigan
type tax program, a land acquisition/improvement program and a realistic
concessionary loan program. The results show that this package is more
than sufficient to overcome the differential. This is another combination
which I believe could be replicated given the development programs in
place today. Assumption #20 replaces the land acquisition/improvement
package in assumption #19 with a labor training program. Again, the re-
sults show that the differential was overcome. Assumption #21 models a
case in which the project is financed more heavily with debt. The results
show that the concessionary interest rate required to overcome the differ-
ential (4%) is still below those rates which would typically be available
to firms through concessionary loan programs.
Some general conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis:
- that the NPV differential between suburban and non-subsidized
urban sites may be substantial;
- that in and of themselves, each of the incentive programs ap-
pear to not be powerful enough to overcome this differential unless they
are of a size far beyond that which could be characterized as typical
within the world of contemporary incentive programs;
- that certain combinations of incentive programs (which could be
replicated in the "real world" given the offerings of contemporary devel-
opment organizations) appear to be powerful enough to overcome the differ-
ential.
- that the assumption of a labor cost differential in favor of the
urban community is central to the above results. That is, without this
labor cost advantage it is unlikely that even combinations of incentive
programs of normal proportions would be able to overcome the suburban/
urban NPV differential.
- that the incentive programs which operate through an interest
rate concession of some sort are unlikely to be sufficient to overcome the
differential (assuming normal debt contributions to project financing) un-
less the loans carry almost no interest liability whatsoever.
An empirical look at the role of incentives in the decision processes
of firms in this author's interview sample follows in chapter 4. To close
out this chapter, a case quite relevant to the above discussion is present-
ed. It indicates that some firms do, in fact, utilize analytical frame-
works similar to that presented above in the process of making an urban/
suburban locational choice.
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A "Real World" Application
This example involves a Boston-based manufacturer currently exper-
iencing a period of very substantial growth. The planned expansion would
more than double the firm's manufacturing employment. It is interesting,
not only due to the application of a "present value" analytical framework,
but also since it raises a number of interesting issues to be addressed in
the chapters to follow. The firm considered two expansion alternatives --
one urban, one suburban. The urban alternative involved plans for con-
struction of separate sites in three different municipalities. The analyt-
ical framework applied by the firm is not APV, but does involve a compari-
son of the estimated present value of operating and fixed costs at the
alternative sites. No inflation, depreciation or tax assumptions are made
explicit and no rationale is given for the choice of a 12% cost of capital
assumption. Nevertheless, this was, by far, the most formal application
of a present value evaluation framework to the process of making a loca-
tion decision encountered by this author. Furthermore, direct estimates
of the costs of building and land were made for both locations. Estimated
urban costs for building and land exceeded the suburban estimates by 24%.
Equipment costs were invariant across locations. Estimates of urban
operating costs (for building and building maintenance only) exceeded those
made for the suburban location by 12%. The end result of this analysis was
that present value suburban costs were some 77% of those for the urban
site -- an $8,750,000 differential.
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What is most interesting about this particular case is the way in
which IRB financing enters into the analysis. The suburban plan was for
the location of one facility in each of three separate municipalities. The
rationale behind this particular plan is that the firm can apply for a
$10,000,000 IRB from each jurisdiction -- although the analysis assumed
that only two IRB's would be utilized. In contrast, due to this particular
firm's heavy capital expenditures within the City of Boston over the past
three years, it could only apply for a single $1, 000, 000 IRB for issuance
through the City due to the IRS limits on such issues (see chapter 1).
Therefore, the availability of "incentive" financing within the suburbs
creates a net "disincentive" for the firm to locate within the city. To
compensate the firm for the urban/suburban cost differential, as well as
the net financial disincentives, (note: the firm's present value calcula-
tion did take into account the impact of the differential IRB availability on
the project's financial structure), a UDAG application for more than
$7, 000,000 was made to HUD to be used to finance a very low interest
loan to the firm (30-year, $6, 750, 000 with principal repayments to start in
the ninth year). Note that a $2,000,000 difference exists between the
estimated urban/suburban cost differential ($8, 750, 000) and the face val-
ue of the loan ($6,750,000). This $2,000,000 represents the firm's esti-
mate of the "Value of City Life" derived from the presence of such hard-
to-quantify factors as quantity and quality of labor supply and
"agglomeration benefits". Agglomeration benefits derive from the concen-
tration of facilities within the city as contrasted with a decentralized
network of three suburban sites and the (existing) central city facility.
This example, I believe, reinforces the conclusions drawn from the hypo-
thetical example presented above, namely: that the cost differential be-
tween urban and suburban sites is likely to be substantial; that incentives
can be made sufficiently large to overcome such differentials; and, that
in cases in which the entire subsidy is to be provided through a conces-
sionary loan instrument, it is likely that the concessions will have to be
substantial (in this particular case, interest rates well below "market"
(i.e. 3% to 5%) plus a provision for deferral of principal repayments). The
role of "hard-to-quantify" factors in the location decision process will be
discussed in detail in chapter 4. A discussion of some of the implications
of the availability of similar incentives in contiguous jurisdictions will
be offered in chapter 3 (from the perspective of the local development
organizations themselves).
CHAPTER 3
The Development Organization
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss some of the implications
of the use of "incentives to industry" from the development organization's
perspective. The provision of the various financial instrumehts through
government entities, in effect, transforms these public bodies into fin-
ancial intermediaries. As discussed above, government bodies may offer
financial assistance in the following ways: direct provision of low cost
funds; provision of guarantees on corporate debt; and, assistance in the
placement of corporate debt in the tax-exempt market. The example at
the end of the previous chapter demonstrated that certain costs or reve-
nue losses may result from the provision of this financial assistance.
This chapter will focus on the various costs incurred by the public issu-
ers of these financial instruments.
IRB's
IRB's are quite inexpensive incentive instruments from the local
issuing government's viewpoint. The funds come from a private lender
and (as is the case in Boston) typically, the subsidized firm is directly
accountable for the principal and interest payments. In effect, the issu-
ing government body has -- as an intermediary -- transferred its tax-
exempt borrowing status to a private sector firm. Hence, the issuing lo-
cal government body may incur little more than administrative costs.
However, the cost of this subsidy is borne by the Federal government
since it sustains a tax revenue loss due to the tax-exempt nature of these
vehicles. The local government, through issuance of an IRB, has passed
the cost of the subsidy on to the Federal government, and hence, to all
taxpayers as well.
From the perspective provided by finance theory, the issuer is market-
ing a financial instrument which it implicitly assumes will be attractive to
high tax-bracket investors. Theoretically, the IRB will carry the interest
rate demanded by the marginal investor who is just indifferent between the
IRB and normal, taxable corporate debt of similar risk -- given his margin-
al personal tax rate (see Sanford Rose (37)). If the marginal investor
which an IRB issue must attract in order to place the entire issue is taxed
at 35%, and the rate on taxable issues of equivalent risk is 13%, then the
IRB must offer a tax-free rate of 8.45%. What is most interesting is that
the investor with a marginal personal tax rate of 45% receives a windfall
by purchasing this bond relative to corporate debt. That is, the -8.45%
tax-free is equivalent to approximately 15.4% taxable. Since the average
investor in a tax-exempt issue is, by definition, in a higher tax bracket
than the marginal investor, "the Treasury invariably loses much more in
foregone tax revenues than the municipalities save on interest costs"' --
in the case of an IRB, the municipal "intermediary" passes this interest
savings on to the subsidized firm. The higher the yield on the IRB rela-
tive to taxable bonds of equivalent risk, the worse is the situation from
ISanford Rose, "The Trouble With Municipal Bonds Is Not Just New
York", Fortune, (December 1975), p. 105.
the Federal government's perspective. However, to the extent that the
subsidized firm assumes less interest expense with the issue of an IRB.
its deductions from income for state and Federal -tax purposes are lessened
and these tax payments increased relative to the conventional financing
case. In sum, beyond the interest savings accruing to the subsidized
firm, virtually all purchasers of IRB's receive a bonus as well.
In a subtle way, the issuance of IRB's may cost local governments
more than administrative expenses. Due to the increase in the supply of
tax-exempt instruments resulting from repeated issuance of IRB's, the
prices for tax-exempt instruments in general may fall (i.e. yields in-
crease). If this occurs, local governments which approach the tax-
exempt market with a general obligation bond issue will face higher inter-
est rates than had existed prior to the sale of the !RB's. Offsetting this
state of affairs, however, is the possibility that the IRB truly induced a
firm to locate within the boundaries of the issuing jurisdiction, thereby
increasing the property tax revenues flowing to this local government (de-
pending, of course, upon the structure of any lease and/or in lieu of tax
provisions).
A final difficulty with IRB's -- less quantitative in nature -- is the
potential for abuse in their application. Theoretically, IRB's are issued
by a "distressed" community to create employment opportunities "which
may represent significant positive externalities "2 particularly as involves
2 Roger Sherman and Thomas D. Willett, "Regional Development, Ex-
ternalities, and Tax-Subsidy Combinations", National Tax Journal, 22,
no. 2, (une, 1969), p. 292.
the local labor force. Here we are entering a zone of hard-to-quantify
factors. However, in many cases IRB's are issued to support projects
which do not offer many permanent employment opportunities. In Cleve-
land, for example, there is evidence that these bonds have been issued
for such undertakings as fast-food outlets and racketball clubs.
Property Tax Holidays
This appears to represent a less complex situation. Here the inci-
dence of the incentive falls directly on the local community (i.e. other
taxpayers) which provides it. If the tax break is absolute for the subsi-
dized firm, then not only is the firm exempted from funding community ser-
vices in general, but also any which must be provided exclusively for the
subsidized firm. Hence there may be direct costs as well as a lost tax
revenue opportunity. If, as in all these cases, the investment is truly
induced by the availability of the incentive, then certain social benefits
are assumed to offset this cost.
An interesting by-product is that if the subsidized firm accepts this
property tax holiday, then it has that much less to deduct from income for
state.and federal tax purposes, and thus state and federal revenues will
increa se. 3
Concessionary Loans
The role of government entities as financial intermediaries is clearest
in this case since a direct transfer from government to firm takes place.
3Daryl A. Hellman et al., State Financial Incentives to Industry,
(Lexington, Mass., D.C. Heath and Company, 1976), p. 41.
If the issuer of the concessionary loan is a local government, then the
local government's source of funding becomes the key consideration.
Typically, a local government receives a grant from a Federal agency to be
used in making a concessionary loan. In this case, the local government
clearly faces few costs in its issuance of a subsidy, although it should
recognize that it has assumed some default risks.
In some instances, the local government issues general obligation
bonds and then lends the proceeds to a firm at the same rate as that on
the bonds. In this case, (and in cases involving direct loans from a Fed-
eral agency) the government has also exposed itself to default risk. Typi-
cally, financial institutions (or buyers of corporate debt in general) will
require a rate of interest on a loan such that its expected return (i.e.
inclusive of the probability of default) is at least equivalent to this lend-
er's opportunity cost of funds on riskless investments (assuming that all
risk in this instance is that of default). 4 Similarly, if a government issues
bonds and then purchases some firm's debt at the same (i.e. bond) inter-
est rate, and there is some default risk on the debt, then the government's
expected return on the debt will be less than the promised return. Also
of relevance is the fact that, relative to a loan made through conventional
channels, the subsidized firm has less interest to deduct from income for
purposes of Federal and state taxes, increasing these tax payments, and
4William F. Sharpe, Investments, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1980), p. 248.
thereby (as was the case with IRB's) offsetting the Federal tax revenue
losses attributable to the use of tax-exempt general obligation bonds to
fund the concessionary loan.
Loan Guarantees
Loan guarantees are the most interesting of the incentives as viewed
from the development entity's perspective. Although they are a liability
of the issuing body (primarily the Federal government), they are quite pop-
ular since this liability is typically not accounted for in the budgetary
process. Hence, government bodies may provide substantial incentives/
subsidies to firms without the need for a budget approval.
There is evidence that the various development entities recognize
this particular advantage of loan guarantees. First, the terms of a guar-
antee are generally more advantageous than those of a direct loan from the
same program. For example, the SBA (502) program provides a guarantee --
and hence a reduction in interest costs -- on up to 81% (90% guarantee on
the 90% contribution from the private lender) of the financial package,
whereas a direct loan from SBA would only provide an interest cost reduc-
tion on 30% of the project financing. Furthermore, qualification terms are
more stringent for a direct loan. A more forthright indication of the recog-
nition of this "off-budget" advantage of guarantees is a quote from an EDIC
publication on financial incentive offerings: "Due to the limited level of
direct SBA funding it is more commonly structured on a guaranteed basis. 5
5 Economic Development and Industrial Corporation of Boston, Finan-
cial Assistance Programs, p. 3.
Another item of interest is the interest rate ceilings which are set
for the private lenders who wish to participate in these loan guarantee
arrangements. The SBA (502) program limits the rate which the private
lender can charge for its portion of the loan to 1/2% over prime. As dis-
cussed above, a loan guarantee issued by the Federal government provides
the holder of the corporate debt with essentially an investment as safe as
Treasury Bills, the return on which is the risk-free rate. If a private lend-
er charges 1/2% over prime for a guaranteed loan, it is, in effect, receiv-
ing a substantial windfall. That is, since the prime rate typically ex-
ceeds the T-bill rate, the lender's return on the guaranteed debt will
exceed -- potentially by a not insignificant amount -- that on other risk-
less investments. If such a premium is available, one would expect to
see a market for the opportunity to buy such guaranteed debt.
These instruments -- as discussed in chapter 2 -- do have value.
From the firm's point of view, the formulation discussed in chapter 2 is
appropriate since the firm's only concern is in the net change in interest
rate on its debt which results from the guarantee. However, there is an
alternative method available for valuation of loan guarantees, a more dir-
ect method -- option theory. The literature on the use of loan guarantees
to induce investment in the older urban centers does not include a discus-
sion of the option valuation methodology. It is included here since, al-
though these guarantees may be small compared to those issued to Lock-
heed and Chrysler, it is important to recognize that these guarantees do
have value and represent a liability to the issuing government. This value
can be computed directly -- as an alternative to accepting the market's
implicit valuation of the guarantee -- through the application of option
theory. (The following discussion has referenced the following articles:
Merton (25) (26) (27)).
The debt and equity of a firm can be modelled in terms of options.
Briefly, a put option (European) on common stocks allows its owner to
sell a specific number of shares of that stock at some specified share
price (exercise price) on a certain expiration date. The put option will
be exercised when the stock price (S) is less than the exercise price (E)
(on the expiration date). The value of the put per share in this instance
is (E-S). If the exercise price is less than the stock price on the expira-
tion date, then the option is not exercised and has no value. The stand-
ard formulation for the value of a put is written as: MAX (O, E-S). This
whole process is also known as contingent claims analysis since the val-
ue of the option is contingent upon the share price on the expiration date.
A put is likened to insurance since the holder is sure that on the expira-
tion date he will be able to sell his stock for E at minimum. The value of
a put can be ascertained directly using the Black/Scholes ( 1 ) formula
which requires as inputs: E, S, time to expiration date, interest rate on
riskless securities and the variance on the stock's rate of return. As Mert-
on explains, "Of those, only the variance rate on the stock is not directly
observable, and it can be reasonably estimated". 6 (The Black/Scholes
6Robert C. Merton, "An Analytic Derivation of the Cost of Deposit
Insurance and Loan Guarantees", Tournal of Banking and Finance, 1, (1977),
p. 6.
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formula need not be described in further detail for purposes of this dis-
; cussion, see (1)).
Turning now to debt issues, if default risk exists, debt issued with
a promised payment (P) will return less at maturity if the value of the issu-
ing firm (V) is less than (P). Hence, the value of debt at maturity can be
represented as MIN (V, P). If a guarantee is issued, the debt is ensured
to be worth P at the maturity date. "Like a traditional insurance policy,
the guarantee has value to the insured and imposes a cost on the insur-
er. "7 The government has, in effect, absorbed the risk of default and
hence, private lenders will be willing to advance funds with a return in
the vicinity of the riskless rate. If the firm defaults (i.e. P>V), then the
insurer must make a payment to the debtholder of P-V. With no default,
no payment by the insurer is required. Hence, at maturity the value of
the guarantee is: MAX (O, P-V) which looks like the formulation for a
put option with P acting as an exercise price and V as the stock price.
"Essentially, by guaranteeing the debt issue, the guarantor has issued
a put option on the assets of the firm", 8 and can be valued as such.
Two recent articles, Jones and Mason (16) and Sosin (46), have in-
cluded estimates of the value of such guarantees using this analytical
framework and a variety of assumptions regarding the relevant parameters.
Sosin concludes: "For firms with variances and capital. structure approxi-
7Ibid., p. 7.
8Ibid., p. 8.
mating those of the market as a whole (r = 1.5 (standard deviation)), s =
.75 (fraction of equity in capital structure) the costs of these guarantees
are relatively-s-mall for 5 and 10 year terms (4.16l% or less of the value of
the project). "9
Of primary importance for purposes of this paper, is that this method-
ology explicitly models the increased value of these guarantees as project
risk increases, which translates into an increase in the liability of the
issuing government. That is, the liability can be valued directly.
Leaving option theory, there remain a few comments to be made re-
garding these guarantees. As was the case with the other incentives, the
reduced interest costs attributable to the guarantee increase Federal and
state tax revenues, thereby offsetting the cost of the incentive. Note that
since most guarantees emanate from the Federal government, the local
government organizations through which they flow once again find them-
selves in a low cost position. The local government will receive a cash
inflow from property tax payments made by the guarantee-recipient firm,
although there will be outflows from the local government to cover the
costs associated with the firm locating within the community (i.e. incre-
mental services).
Non-Financial Programs
- Labor training programs and land or building acquisition/improvement
programs are the primary non-financial incentives considered in this paper.
9 Howard B. Sosin, "On the Valuation of Federal Loan Guarantees to
Corporations", The Tournal of Finance, 35, (December 1980), p. 1219.
Typically, the development agency receives a grant from a Federal agency
to cover the costs of these programs. The grants usually are sufficient
to cover any operating or administrative costs wbich may be incurred. In
the case of UDAG funding of property improvements, my interviews with
development agency personnel indicated that the chances of HUD accept-
ance of a UDAG application could be improved through inclusion of a
requirement that the subsidized firm (over some period of time) make pay-
ments to the local development agency in an amount equal to that of the
UDAG plus some nominal interest charge. These funds are then recycled
in the redevelopment process. Rental payments for the land might also
include an in lieu of property tax component and/or a component to re-
imburse the local agency for any general revenue bond obligations it may
have incurred in financing these undertakings. Finally, the local develop-
ment agency may sell the land to the user firm, usually for an amount less
than its total investment in acquiring and improving the property. In this
case, the development agency recaptures a portion of the grant funding
provided by the Federal government, although a substantial subsidy is
still passed on to the user firm. This arrangement would also result in a
property tax inflow to the local community.
To the extent that a community funds its development efforts with its
own financial resources, these non-financial incentives may be more cost-
ly than some of the other incentives, and/or present more difficulties with
respect to liquidity. For example, labor training programs operated by a
development organization will involve a number of operating and admini-
stration costs, which may be funded by property tax collections or a gen-
eral revenue bond issue. Obviously, it is easier for the city to grant a
property tax holiday than to collect property taxes and put the proceeds
into a training program; easier in terms of both liquidity and the size of the
administrative burden taken on by the development organization. Similarly,
the acquisition-and-improvement of land and the renovation-and-operation
of obsolete structures represent more costly undertakings to a city than do
simple property tax concessions.
Recognition of Incentive Costs
The role of government bodies as lending institutions raises some in-
teresting issues regarding the financing of "marginal" industrial develop-
ment projects -- marginal in the sense that they are not viable in a net
present value sense for any number of reasons (high cost, high risk, etc.).
Private financial institutions may not be willing to advance funds in sup-
port of such undertakings. In the area of industrial redevelopment, the
use of incentives/subsidies by government are held to be justifiable in
cases in which there exist: "Private economic activities which cost more
than the sum of the benefits accruing to private participants but less than
the aggregate social benefit. "10 This is a "market failure" argument since
the implicit assumption is that externalities are not being recognized by
the private market. Given this scenario, arguments of the following vari-
ety are regularly advanced in the literature:
10E. Philip Jones and Scott P. Mason, "Valuation of Loan Guarantees",
Journal of Banking and Finance, 4, (1980), p. 89.
- "Investments that are considered marginal by lending institu-
tions may be viewed more favorably in light of the availability of loan
guarantees" l l as well as other incentive instruments;
- That some firms offer "economically feasible projects" for which
they "cannot obtain adequate capital from private lending sources".12
- That some projects should be financed by a government since
only government "may be prepared to finance high-risk industry which can-
not obtain financing elsewhere".13
It seems that there is an implicit assumption within statements such
as these that (since government represents the entire populace) risk is
effectively diversified away through government financing of risky pro-
jects. However, assuming the projects under study are characterized by
some element of systematic risk, the market has determined that the ex-
pected return on these "economically feasible projects" is not sufficient
to compensate investors for the level of systematic risk which the projects
represent. Hence, from the market's perspective, the projects have been
deemed "marginal" or uneconomical. Systematic risk cannot be diversified
away simply through provision of government financing. Hence, there are
costs which the government has taken on in financing these projects which
should be explicitly recognized. For example, as discussed in the pre-
"lHubbell, p. 297.
121bid., p. 297.
13 Ralph C. Kimball, "States as Financial Intermediaries", New England
Economic Review, (an./Feb. 1976), p. 25.
vious section, there is a cost attributable to the provision of loan guar-
antees to industry -- effectively a free insurance policy issued to the
firm's shareholders covering the value of the firm's assets -- which
typically is not recognized in the government budgeting process. Hence,
in cases where government takes a position in project financing, it should
be recognized that an implicit assumption has been made that the value of
the positive externalities (social benefits) which are expected to result
from undertaking the project is greater than the cost of providing these
incentives/subsidies. Where risks are high -- a loan guarantee pro-
vided on Chrysler debt, for example -- these costs may not be trivial.
Interlocal/Inter-regional Competition
The example given at the end of the previous chapter indicated that
financial incentives may be available from the governments of both the
central city and contiguous localities. The structure and outcome of
such a state of affairs reminded this author of game theory. Only one
very brief reference to the applicability of game theory to this issue was
uncovered in my literature search (Sherman and Willett (45)), who note
that "localities and even states may be caught in the famous prisoner's
dilemma, each one competing against the others to attract industry". 14
An application of the prisoner's dilemma framework to the issue follows.
Assumptions are as follows:
14 Sherman and Willett, p. 293.
- two contiguous localities constitute a region;
- each locality is interested in attracting industry for some reason
(perhaps to lessen labor-surplus difficulties);
- each locality perceives that incentives/subsidies are quite effec-
tive in attracting a pool of mobile industrial firms which have expressed an
interest in expanding or relocating somewhere within the region;
- the incentive instrument choice for the localities is limited to
property tax concessions;
- for one reason or another, no firms are attracted to the region
solely due to the availability of this particular incentive (the plausibility
of this and other assumptions will be the focus of chapter 4).
From the perspective of each locality, there exist a variety of possible
outcomes of its decision to offer or not to offer the incentives:
-(A)- both localities offer the same incentives exactly, hence
will each attract.50% of the pool of mobile industry. In this case, the use
of a tax incentive results in lost property tax revenue opportunities, al-
though each locality's needs for new industry will be addressed to some
extent. Assume that this outcome is worth 45 assets of some sort to a
locality for purposes of the illustration presented below;
-(B)- neither will offer the incentives, hence, each will attract
50% of the pool of mobile industry. In this case, all local property tax
revenues are collected and each locality's needs for new industry are sat-
isfied to the same extent as in case (A). Due to the increased tax revenue,
this outcome is worth 50 assets;
-(C)- one locality offers the incentive, and its neighbor does not,
thereby causing 100% of the mobile industry to locate within the former lo-
cality. In this case, the application of the incentive results in lost pro-
perty tax revenue opportunities for the incentive-user locality, although
this locality's needs for industry will be satisfied to a greater extent than
in case (A). Assume this outcome is worth 90 assets to the incentive-
user locality and 0 to the non-user.
Given the above structure, the choice situation with respect to the
provision of the incentive can be summarized as follows:
Table 4 -- Game Theory, Choice Matrix 1
Locality A
Do Not
Provide Provide
Incentives Incentives
45 0 O
Provide
Incentives
Locality B 45 90
90 50
Do Not
Provide
Incentives
0 50
As in the prisoners' dilemma case, here we find that each locality
will selfishly choose to provide the incentives regardless of the choice
made by the other locality. This "provide/provide" outcome results in a
lower total "regional" result than would the "don't provide" choice were
both localities to make it. Note that this result is based only upon the
perception by the localities that the incentives are effective in achieving
the desired result of impacting the location decision of mobile firms.
If one assumes that the incentives have no impact on the location de-
cisions of firms and that 50% of the mobile industry would locate within
each locality under all conditions, then the choice matrix looks as fol-
lows:
Table 5 -- Game Theory, Choice Matrix 2
Locality A
Do Not
Provide Provide
Incentives Incentives
Provide
Incentives
Locality B
Do Not
Provide
Incentives
If firms are truly insensitive to incentives in this way, then no dil-
emma exists and the "don't provide/don't provide" choice results. Diffi-
culty in measuring the effectiveness of these instruments may cause
jurisdictions to assume that the first matrix accurately reflects the loca-
tion decision process and the resultant payoffs. Evidence that this is in
fact the case was provided in an interview with an "industrial representa-
tive" for the State of Michigan's Office of Economic Development who
claimed that Michigan provided a full range of incentive programs since
45 50
45 45
45 50
50 50
"everybody has them". "Everybody" was in reference to the states within
Michigan's immediate geographic region.
The game can be made considerably more complex. For example, if
the two contiguous communities differ with respect to the availability of
some factor which firms deem to be of particular importance (e.g. low-
cost labor), then the less well-endowed community would have to provide
a larger subsidy than its counterpart in order to attract the mobile firms.
That is, the less well-endowed community would have to compensate
firms for the absence of that factor. This situation is equivalent to that
described in the hypothetical example described in chapter 2 in which the
size of the subsidy required to overcome the urban/suburban NPV differ-
ential doubled under the assumption that the urban community was not
able to provide labor-cost savings vis-a-vis the suburban alternative.
Hence, there are three players in this version of the game (i.e. the two
competing communities and the firm).
Further complications would involve:
- the differential attractiveness of community factor endowments
and incentive offerings to firms in different industries. For example, a
labor surplus community offering labor training programs would be more
attractive to labor-intensive firms than to capital-intensive firms which
in turn might be particularly sensitive to environmental protection codes
or raw material availability;
- the extent to which firms are capable of accurately computing
the value of incentive opportunities;
- the differential accessibility of Federal funds to communities
characterized by differing levels of "economic distress".
Clearly, the above discussion raises many questions regarding the
actual operation of the location decision process. Of particular interest
is the ability of these incentives -- in and of themselves -- to attract
firms not otherwise interested in locating within that region. Also of
interest is the frequency with which the incentives act as a critical fact-
or in the retention of mobile, local industry. It is to such issues that
discussion now turns.
CHAPTER 4
Incentives and The Location Decision Process
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the factors entering into
the location decision processes of firms which have received subsidies/
incentives from development organizations. Particular attention will be
paid to the actual level at which these incentives enter the decision pro-
cess and to the objectives and activities of the local development agency.
Sources of information for this discussion include:
- a set of 21 interviews conducted by this author with individuals
representing 8 firms and 5 development organizations directly involved in
recent locations of new, expanded or relocated facilities within the three
jurisdictions introduced in chapter 1 -- Cleveland, Boston and the State
of Michigan. Obviously, in some cases, interviews were conducted with
more than one person from a single organization;
- material published by the development organizations describing
recent locational activity within their jurisdictions and, in one case, the
results of some survey work conducted with firms that had received subsi-
dies;
- a sampling from the literature.
I. The Location Decision of Subsidized Firms
(a) Key Factors
The location decision process is not easily generalized. Schmenner
has noted: "It cannot be stressed enough how difficult the modelling of
industry location appears to be. "l For each of the firms for which inter-
view data were collected for purposes of this study, it seems that a
unique set of factor weights was employed in the location decision pro-
cess. The factors which entered into these firms' decision processes
included the following: labor availability, labor quality, labor relations
situation (union/non-union), availability of adjacent property for expan-
sion, amount of space available on one floor, cost of space, proximity
to suppliers, proximity to market, tradition, preferences of owners/top
executives, proximity to prior location such that existing labor force
could be utilized, "business climate" within the locality, access to
transportation/distribution systems, proximity to existing facilities of
that firm, a commitment on the part of a top executive to the provision of
employment opportunities within a particular community, expected operat-
ing costs, parking space, personal taxes, property taxes, availability of
incentives/subsidies. Note that a number of the above factors can be
characterized as "hard-to-quantify". In general, only two or three of
these factors acted as primary determinants in the location choice of each
firm and as alluded to above, the specific combination of factors varied
considerably from firm to firm.
(b) The Operation of The Decision Process - Interview Findings
An initial observation to be drawn from the interview data is that firms
do not undertake as rigorous a locational search and analysis of alterna-
IR. W. Schmenner, "City Taxes and Industry Location", revision of
his unpublished Ph.D dissertation, (Yale University, 1973), no pagina-
tion.
tives as the literature would lead one to believe. Clearly, to make an
optimum decision, a firm would have to evaluate and compare a number
of distinct locations and possess much information regarding the cost
characteristics of each. However, the interview evidence indicates that
firms cost out few alternative sites and settle for a "satisfactory loca-
tion rather than an optimum location". 2 A review of the interview evi-
dence follows.
In general, tradition (i.e. an extended history of operation within a
single community) and proximity to suppliers were primary factors in the
location decisions of the smaller firms studied by this author (less than
100 employees). The availability of a specific amount of space on one
floor and proximity to the firm's prior location (such that the existing
labor force could be utilized) were also important considerations for these
firms. In these cases, only sites within that community housing the exist-
ing facility were .considered. Evaluation techniques were not sophisticated,
very few alternatives were considered, and moves -- these were reloca-
tions of existing operations, not branch expansions -- were very short.
Specifically, one smaller firm had been located in Boston for years
and its management had absolutely no intention of locating elsewhere.
Its management was looking for at least 35, 000 square feet of space on
one floor, sufficient off-street parking and ease of accessibility by the
workforce. The owners/managers of a second small firm wished to remain
P. M. Townroe, Industrial Movement Exoerience in the US. and the
UK, (Westmead, Farnborough, Hants., England, Saxon House, 1979),
p. 142.
within Boston due to a perceived need to remain close to existing suppli-
ers. There was also an interest in a specific amount of space on one
floor. From the outset, the owners/managers of both firms restricted the
search for a new site to Boston. Both relocated within a few miles of the
previous site. Neither formally evaluated the costs of its new site. In
both cases the location decision was made by the firm's President. Both
noted that high moving costs and interruption of operations were unexpect-
ed by-products of these relocations.
The larger firms isolated a broader range of primary factors with which
to screen locations. There was evidence of a greater awareness of the fin-
ancial ramifications of the project (as manifested in the present value
example discussed at the end of chapter 2), although, once again, there
were indications that few alternative locations were evaluated. Hard-to-
quantify factors played a role in many cases, again as demonstrated in
the chapter 2 example where a location's proximity to a firm's existing
facilities was given a value of $2,000,000 in the location comparison
analysis. Top management played a key role in a number of decisions
even for the larger firms.
The primary factors entering into the location decision processes of
the larger, interviewed firms are as follows: one was interested in a spe-
cific central city location for proximity to major customers; another was
very impressed with the performance of the workforce at one of its cen-
tral city plants and wanted to take advantage of this asset as it expanded;
another wished to keep all of its manufacturing operations concentrated
geographically; two were primarily interested -- apparently due to a per-
sonal interest on the part of the chief executive -- in providing employ-
ment opportunities within specific central city communities. Only two of
these larger firms seriously evaluated more than one site in the establish-
ment of these particular facilities, and only one -- that from the chapter
2 example -- evaluated an alternative suburban site. The only direct evi-
dence of a complete attempt at costing out a location was, once again,
that described in chapter 2. None of the firms was entering the region
for the first time. That is, all had major facilities already located with-
in the central city or in a nearby suburb. The two firms demonstrating a
social commitment from the "top" were the only firms whose primary op-
erations were located in the suburbs.
(c) Top-Management and The Social Objective
The issue of a "social commitment" on the part of a top-executive to
provide employment opportunities within a certain central city community
is an interesting one, particularly since it played a "primary" role in the
location decision processes of the suburban-based firms only; (note:
these were the suburban-based firms in the interview sample). As will
be discussed below, this "social commitment" appears to gain more of
its motivation from altruism (in these cases) than from any free advertis-
ing or positive public relations returns that might accrue to these firms as
a result of these investments.
Another key distinction that can be made involves differences in the
importance and size of facilities established within the central city by
urban-based and suburban-based firms in the interview sample. The
suburban-based firms -- whose actions contrast with the "flight to the
suburbs" phenomenon -- have established central city facilities of only
"token" size. For example, one of these firms lists 19 facilities in its
10-K report, the smallest of which is three times larger than the central
city facility under study. A smaller suburban-based firm has eight times
more manufacturing space in two suburban plants than will be added in
the central city. In fact, an interviewee from one of these two firms in-
dicated that the central city facility was not considered to be a big
facility or a big effort. Conversely, the firms headquartered within the
central city were undertaking major expansions. For example, the firm
from the chapter 2 example was increasing its manufacturing space by
50%.
Of interest, therefore, is whether the suburban firms were trading
financial return for the satisfaction of a non-profit objective. Unfortun-
ately, no hard data on this issue could be drawn from the interviews,
perhaps since it may be a point of particular sensitivity due to any man-
agement's primary commitment to shareholders to maximize firm value.
At best, the information indicates that these firms perceive costs to be
higher in the central city (though they simultaneously claim that these
are and must continue to be profitable undertakings). An independent in-
dication that this is an accurate reflection of these firm's perception comes
from information gathered on another firm -- not located within the prim-
ary jurisdictions under study -- whose CEO has stated that social
programs and profits can be simultaneously achieved. This individual
is particularly committed to revitalization of central city areas. This
firm has undertaken a variety of innovative projects within central city
areas -- one case being an operation staffed entirely by part-time per-
sonnel; another a light assembly plant with an accompanying child care
facility. This firm also holds 40% of the outstanding voting securities of
a company -- formed by this same individual in conjunction with one
other person -- which provides development agencies with advice and
information on methods of attracting industrial investment to the central
city. There are indications that this company is (as of this writing) pre-
paring a plan for the creation of some 1, 500 new jobs over three to five
years in a labor-surplus area within Boston. (No other information is
available at this time.)
The hypothesis that these firms undertook these projects in order to
derive valuable "hard-to-quantify" by-products (e.g. free publicity or
lessened government regulatory pressure) must be rejected. The hypothe-
sized argument is that these are truly profit-maximizing projects since
the total return on them inclusive of these hard-to-quantify benefits is
actually greater than that indicated by a look at the easily quantifiable
results. None of the interviews indicated that firms considered such sup-
plemental returns in making its location decision, although some did take
advantage of them when given the opportunity to do so. In one case, the
firm's CEO has indicated that the media, in fact, caused the project to be
delayed, thereby increasing costs.
(d) Observations From Other Data Sources
The literature provides substantiation for some of the findings drawn
from the interviews. Once again, Schmenner has noted similar pheno-
mena: "not everything that is important can be quantified; (the) decision
is typically too complex to be evaluated solely by the numbers. "3 Sup-
plementing my findings regarding the role of top management in the deci-
sion process, Schmenner (41), in a study of the location decisions of firms
in Cincinnati and New England found that 56.8% of sites involving more
than 100 workers were recommended by firm Presidents. Rahe (35), in a
similar survey of mobile industry in metropolitan Denver found that with-
in the firm, a single executive made the decision in 41% of the cases.
Wasylenko (59) references a survey of mobile firms in Michigan: "Fifty
percent cited historical accident or personal reasons (such as it is the
birthplace of the founder, or the owner has business connections there)
for the specific site choice. "4
With respect to the financial evaluation of alternatives by large firms,
Schmenner (41), in his study of Cincinnati and New England, found that
40% of the new sites with more than 100 jobs were not costed out.
The investigation of firms which had established central city facili-
ties uncovered no cases in which firms with no prior experience in the
3R. W. Schmenner, Summary of Findings The Location Decisions of
Larger, Multiplant Companies, summary of research to be published in a
book (Prentice-Hall), in late 1981, p. 12.
4 M. J. Wasylenko, "The Role of Taxes and Fiscal Incentives in the
Location of Firms", in Urban Government Finance, Emerging Issues, ed.,
R. Bahl, (Urban Affairs Annual Reviews, 20, Sage, 1981, forthcoming),
p. 11 of draft.
region ("outsiders") entered the central city with a new plant. That is,
all of the firms had existing facilities within the central city or in adja-
cent suburbs. Following along the same lines, a survey (conducted by
a state development agency) of subsidized firms in Michigan (33) found
that 98.5% of these firms had at least one year of operating experience
within the state and 81.3% more than ten years. Summaries of urban indus-
trial location activity within Cleveland and Boston (published by local
development agencies) indicate that the vast majority of such activity
involves firms already operating facilities within the central city. The
only exceptions to this rule were the two suburban-based firms described
in the "Interview Findings" section above.
Another general observation made in the "Interview Findings" section
was that firms utilizing incentives formally evaluate few alternative sites.
In the Michigan survey (33), 56.6% of the subsidized firms considered one
site only; 38. 6% of the total considered sites outside the state and a
lesser percentage considered alternatives within the state.
(e) Universal Factors
Near the top of each interviewed firm's list of primary factors were:
space considerations; and, workforce considerations. Space requirements
varied from firm to firm. In two interview cases involving small firms, at
least 30, 000 square feet on one floor was required, and according to one
of the interviewees, this was a requirement not easily satisfied within the
central city of Boston (i.e. there were not many vacant facilities which
could meet this simple criteria). For the larger firms, two methods were
typically employed to provide the requisite amount of manufacturing space
within the central city -- construction of new plant on a site cleared of
obsolete structures; and, rehabilitation of existing structures. The one
interview case exception was a Cleveland manufacturer which found a
modern facility within the city which met its requirements exactly. The
larger firms were very much concerned with the availability of space for
expansion. Both suburban-based firms indicated that one of their stand-
ard locational requirements was sufficient room for repeated expansions.
In fact, one of these firms expanded its principal suburban site seven
times between 1964 and 1980. Its new central city facility offers very
limited expansion potential. The other firm negotiated a lease on an adja-
cent, recently cleared site for future expansion, although even if utilized,
its total central city facility will still be significantly smaller than that
located at this firm's typical suburban site. The Cleveland firm refer-
enced above was.totally "land-locked" in its old location and could not
buy or lease adjoining space -- although it vigorously attempted to do so.
The central-city based firm from the chapter 2 example not only leased a
multi-story central city structure for renovation, but also a quantity of
adjacent land. Each of these firms indicated that a major trade-off made
in locating in the central city was this lack of space for expansion. The
relative lack of the central city manufacturing space usable by modern in-
dustry came as a surprise to this author. Existing structures are either
not well suited to the needs of industry or a great deal of site clearance
and parcel assembly must be carried out to produce a vacant site which
can accommodate a modern, manufacturing facility. A final indication
that this is a key issue comes from a number of case summaries from
Cleveland in which, once a central city facility had been vacated, an
adjacent firm would buy up (in some cases simply to hold for future expan-
sion possibilities) the land and building(s) just vacated.
The workforce considerations are of equal importance to these firms.
Each of the smaller firms interviewed -- those relocating their entire
operation -- could not afford to move to locations which would result in
a large number of resignations. For the larger firms, the quality, cost
and availability of labor are key issues. For example, one of the subur-
ban-based firms indicated that it was -- contemporaneously with the
undertaking of the central city project -- making plans for a suburban
plant eight times larger than the central city facility. This firm felt that
labor availability for a facility of this size would be a problem in a cen-
tral city location. One particularly sensitive topic in the interviews was
the union/non-union issue, perhaps due to the fact that most of the inter-
viewed firms run non-union shops. Labor cost is another key factor.
Referring once again to the Michigan survey (33) of subsidized firms, 38%
would cancel any plans for new or expanded plant in Michigan were unem-
ployment insurance costs to continue to increase at historical rates; 44%
would do so if workers' compensation costs did the same. The labor cost
issue was singled out by more than 50% of these firms as the most import-
ant for the government to focus on in its efforts to encourage industrial
expansion within the state.
In sum, these two factors appear to be quite central to firms' loca-
tion decisions. It seems that both must be satisfied to some minimum
extent before a site is considered to be viable.
(f) Locational Factors - Evidence of Some Commonality by Industry
Schmenner (42) in some recent survey work (involving a large number
of Fortune 500 firms) finds that locational factor weights in the location
decision process differ across industries. The interview evidence collect-
ed by this author does not span a broad range of industries, although it
does support Schmenner's findings for those industries in the interview
sample. The interviews also provide some evidence that factor weights
may differ across firms in different stages of growth or of different size.
A few of the specific examples noted by Schmenner will serve to
illustrate his point. He notes that capital-intensive firms may be con-
cerned with accessibility to suppliers. High technology firms may be sen-
sitive to the availability of a professional workforce. The perceived
"quality of life" within a community may also play a primary role in high
tech firms location decisions due to their desire to minimize the turnover
of this professional workforce.
Echoing Schmenner's finding regarding the high tech industry's sensi-
tivity to the availability of a professional workforce, top executives from
a number of high tech firms in Massachusetts have formed an industrial
association which has focused its collective efforts on the issue of educa-
tional opportunities in technical fields. The association has been an out-
spoken advocate of the establishment of part-time academic programs in
technical fields. Such programs would enable persons to gather a techni-
cal background without foregoing current earnings. The interview results
indicate that high tech firms are also very sensitive to the issue of
collective labor activity. Interview data were collected on three high
technology firms and each operates within a non-union environment. This
sensitivity to the union issue seems to stem from the rapid technological
change within the industry which requires that firms have the flexibility
to reassign workers to new tasks with some regularity. These firms per-
ceive that they would not have such flexibility within a union environ-
ment.
The interview results also indicate that high growth firms are sensi-
tive to space-related factors, primarily in anticipation of future expan-
sions. Such expansions are facilitated if space is available proximate
to existing facilities. These firms were also sensitive to the availability
of labor, again particularly in anticipation of future expansions..
The smaller firms in the interview sample were more concerned than
the larger firms with proximity to proven markets. Locational tradition
was also weighted more heavily by these firms than was the case with the
larger firms.
II. Introductory Note to the Role of Incentives
In the first chapter, a simple classification scheme defining three
general levels of locational factor importance was introduced. To review,
the three levels were defined as follows:
- Primary factors -- those which a firm would consider in its
initial screening of candidate regions or localities. A candidate which
did not meet this minimum standard would not besevaluated further;
- Secondary factors -- those employed to choose between speci-
fic sites equal in all primary respects;
- Trivial factors -- those having no impact on site selection.
III. The Role of Incentives
As can be deduced from the absence of references to incentives in
the above discussion, these instruments did not appear to play "primary"
roles in the location decision processes of firms in the interview sample.
There is no evidence that incentives caused any of the firms under study to
consider a particular locality due to the availability of these instruments.
It is clear that other factors were central to each firm's "primary" location
search.
(a) Financial Incentives
It appears that financial incentives entered the location decisions of
firm~s in the interview sample at one of two levels -- either trivially or
secondarily. In most cases the incentives had no impact (trivial case),
however, infrequently, the incentives played a secondary role in the
choice of a specific site among urban and suburban alternatives. The key
issue, therefore, involves some measure of the number of firms which,
having chosen a central city location (and having also utilized incentives
of some sort), would not have located within that same central city
community had the financial incentive opportunities not been available
(i.e. chosen another site identified in the primary search). Incentives
provided to firms which consider them to be a triyial factor are wasted by
definition. From the interview evidence, all but one firm fit the trivial
classification. Excluding the exception for a moment, there is clear evi-
dence that the decision to locate within the specific central city was made
well in advance of the point in time in which the firms became aware of
(or negotiated for) specific incentive opportunities. That is, these firms
chose to locate in the central city irrespective of financial incentives.
In the case of the smaller firms there was no doubt that a central
city location would be chosen. In fact, chance played a large part in the
eventual location of each within a property-tax-exempt city-owned struc-
ture. That is, the firms were not attracted by the tax-exemption, but
rather by the characteristics of the structure itself. This chance meeting
of firm and development agency led to the use of an additional financial
incentive instrument on the part of one of these firms -- again well after
the location choice had been made.
Of the larger suburban-based firms (i.e. those primarily interested in
establishing central city facilities so as to provide employment opportuni-
ties within specific communities), one firmed up its "social commitment"
by hiring an individual to be solely responsible for such projects. The
commitment to establish an operation within the specific central city area
which now houses this firm's urban facility, preceded by some years the
negotiation of the incentive package. The interviewee from the other
suburban-based firm indicated that a plant would still have been built
within the target locality in the absence of incentives.
The representatives of the urban-based, larger firms made similar-
statements: one was intent on locating near important central city custom-
ers; another wanted to take advantage of what it felt to be a superior labor
pool. Neither considered suburban alternatives. The interviewee from
this last firm summed up its position on incentives with a statement to the
effect that incentives should be utilized if available since they serve to
cut costs. In other words, even if they did not attract firms to a central
city location, firms locating there in any event would be foregoing an
opportunity to reduce costs if they ignored any incentives available to
them. My claim is that -- with the exception of one firm -- each of the
firms in the interview sample would have chosen the same location for
its new facilities even in the event that incentives were not available.
The incentives were utilized since they represented an opportunity to re-
duce costs.
One role which incentives may play, however, is to reassure the firm
that a favorable business climate exists within the community within which
the firm intends to locate a new facility. This factor was mentioned by the
representative of one firm in the interview sample (one of the suburban-
based firms) whose CEO has stated that it is very important for indrustry
to feel "wanted". In this instance, the incentives appear to signal (to
the firm) that the community desires to attract and accommodate new indus-
trial undertakings. In some cases this simple signal may be sufficient to
83
successfully induce an industrial entry to the central city. That is, some
firms -- due to considerations independent of incentives -- may be on the
verge of undertaking a project within a particular central city community
and may require only a small indication (perhaps as small as an indica-
tion that the "business climate" will be favorable) to tip the balance in
favor of going ahead with the project. Unfortunately, as will be dis-
cussed below, it is reasonable to expect that firms will negotiate for
nothing less than an incentive package as valuable as any provided pre-
viously to firms undertaking similar projects irrespective of the actual
influence of incentives on the ultimate location decision of any of the
firms involved in the process.
The exception is the firm described in the chapter 2 example. This
firm is an urban-based manufacturer and the only firm which made an ex-
plicit comparison of the costs of alternative urban and suburban locations.
The firm's "primary" requirement was to maintain all of its operations with-
in a limited geographic area. Its claim, however, was that the urban
location would absolutely not be selected unless the local development
organization could provide enough incentive funds to make the firm indif-
ferent between the urban site and nearby suburban alternatives. There is
no evidence that the availability of incentives played a role in the primary
selection of these alternative sites. However, it does appear that a fin-
ancial incentive entered as a secondary factor in the decision process.
It is interesting to note, however, that the firm had taken a 25 year lease
on the urban property prior to the negotiation of the incentive package with
the development entity. My interpretation of this situation is that --
primarily due to the preexistence of a lease arrangement on the urban facil-
ity -- this case may be a sophisticated variation, on the general theme of
utilizing incentives simply because they are available, not because they
influence the location choice. That is, it can be argued that the preexis-
tence of a lease indicates a strong intention on the firm's part to locate
a facility at that central city site. The urban/suburban comparison may
simply have been a vehicle to maximize project return through use of in-
centives -- in this case a loan at infinitesimal (given current market condi-
tions) interest rates and a deferred principal repayment plan which guaran-
tees that the loan will be repaid in very cheap future dollars.
Another example of this phenomenon of a firm playing one locality off
against another to gain additional subsidies came from an interview with a
consultant who outlined a recent experience involving a foreign truck man-
ufacturer. The truck manufacturer had narrowed its alternatives -down to
two sites near cities in two southern states. It had selected these parti-
cular sites on the basis of two primary factors: proximity to a significant
labor pool within a "right-to-work" state (i.e. lower potential for unioni-
zation); and, availability of rail and highway transportation facilities.
The development agency (for which this consultant was employed) offered
the firm a special 30-year IRB package to facilitate the financing of the
project. However, the firm told this development agency that it would
select the alternative site unless the quote for the annual in lieu of prop-
erty tax payment was reduced. The proper property tax liability for the
project was $3, 000, 000 per year, the firm was requesting a 50% tax holi-
day for the first 10 years with lesser tax advantages thereafter. The
annual tax savings for the first 10 years would be $1.5 million (nominal).
Compare this figure with a $300 million initial investment and a $40
million estimate for annual salary expense (real). Here again it appears
that the incentives are playing a role in retaining a firm, which, for other
reasons, has demonstrated a strong interest in the community. However,
it is also possible that the firm may simply be attempting to maximize the
value of available incentives, having already made the site choice.
This author is led to conclude, therefore, that for the firms in the
interview sample, locational incentives did not play a "primary" role in
their location decision processes. In one case the incentives may have
played a "secondary" role to retain an urban-based manufacturer which
was contemplating a move to the suburbs.
The results of the Michigan survey (33) of subsidized firms parallel
the interview findings. Only 20% of these firms indicated that they would
cancel plans for expansion within the state if the primary financial incen-
tive instrument -- a property tax concession -- was not available. Recall
from the hypothetical exercise of an earlier chapter that a tax concession
program constructed along the lines of this Michigan program (assumption
#2 from that exercise) provided a relatively weak incentive given the para-
meter estimates of that exercise. Thus, the 20% survey result seems to
reinforce the result drawn from the hypothetical exercise for this specific
incentive. (Note: since only incentive-user firms were included in the
Michigan survey, it is possible that some of the surveyed firms would
overstate the importance of the incentives in their locations decisions
so as to justify their acceptance of these subsidies, hence, the 20% re-
sult may actually overstate the effectiveness of Michigan's program.)
Only 3% of these firms indicated that low cost IRB's should be provided
to encourage business expansion within the state. This last finding is
also in line with the results of the hypothetical exercise (i.e. assump-
tion #16).
Turning to the literature, one notes that this is not the first empirical
work to have reached the conclusion that these financial incentive instru-
ments are not particularly effective. (In fact, one is pressed to cite a
single study which finds the opposite.) The trendsetting piece of work
(cited very frequently in the literature) is an article written by Tohn F. Due
(3) on the influence of taxes on the location of industry. Due concluded
that taxes did not play a major role in the location of industry and that
relatively high tax levels do not have disasterous effects. He also indicat-
ed that, in some instances, taxes may play a deciding role in interlocal
decisions. A number of statistical studies have been completed and few
have found that financial incentives significantly explain location out-
comes. Wasylenko (59) in a forthcoming article provides an excellent
review of this work.
A variety of surveys have also been conducted. In his study of mobile
firms in Cincinnati and New England, Schmenner (41) found that one-quarter
of the surveyed firms moved to locations with higher property tax rates and
about one-half moved to locations with similar rates. Sazama (38) in a
survey of the impact of state development loans found that "only 8 per
cent definitely would have located- irr-another state if they had not re-
ceived a loan" 5 (note: Sazama only surveyed subsidized firms). A sur-
vey referenced by Williamson (60) found that only 4% of surveyed firms
considered financial incentives to be a "principal reason" for choosing
the plant location. All of these findings seem to parallel those of the
hypothetical chapter 2 example which indicated that, taken individually,
these incentive instruments may not be powerful enough to compensate
firms for the higher costs of central city operation.
Before leaving the issue of the role of financial incentives, one in-
teresting perspective which surfaced in the interview process is worthy
of mention. One of the small firms, having located within a property-tax-
exempt, city-owned structure, indicated that it had rejected an opportunity
to partially fund its relocation with a concessionary loan from one of the
incentive programs described in chapter 1, deciding instead to make use of
a line of credit extended to it at a higher rate through a commercial bank.
Management's reasoning was simple: the concessionary loan required the
owners/managers to personally guarantee the loan, an action which would
have resulted in the loss of the limited liability protection which derives
from the incorporation of the firm*. Clearly, this limited liability protec-
tion was worth more to the management than the interest savings available
5G. W. Sazama, "State Industrial Development Loans: A General
Analysis", Land Economics, 46, (May 1970), p. 177.
through the concessionary loan. Interestingly, even though this firm had
no interest in relocating outside of the central city, the subsidies were
still readily available.
This decision to reject an incentive/subsidy opportunity brings to mind
a hypothesis made by Townroe (55). His hypothesis was that even where
significant incentives are available they may rarely prompt a location
search since some firms "may be eager to demonstrate that they should
not be thought of as exploiting a social or political situation in receiving
public money". 6 Clearly, although the firms described above did not con-
sider the incentives to be a primary factor, they did not exhibit any reluct-
ance to utilize the incentives.
(b) Non-Financial Incentives
The firms in the interview sample appear to have been somewhat more
responsive to non-financial incentive opportunities made available to them.
In these cases, the non-financial programs involved either development
agency participation in the assembly and improvement of central city land
or the renovation of obsolete structures so as to accommodate modern indus-
try. This responsiveness to these opportunities may reflect the import-
ance of space-related factors to these firms. The evidence involves four
firms -- two small/urban-based; one large/urban-based; one large/suburb-
an-based.
Both small firms were under some pressure to relocate -- one due to
space limitations, the other due to a lease expiration. Neither considered
6Townroe, Industrial Movement, p. 132.
the possibility of a move to a location outside of the central city which
housed their current operations. A secondary concern of both firms was
the availability of a certain amount of modern, industrial space on one
floor. Both firms finally relocated to the same structure, a multi-story
warehouse renovated and improved by the local development entity to
accommodate light industry. It is clear that the availability of such space
had an impact on the specific site choice made by these firms.
Similarly, both of the larger firms (one urban-, one suburban-based)
chose to locate a new facility on property assembled by a local develop-
ment entity. Though both had made the primary location decision based
on other factors (proximity to major customers in one case, a "social
commitment" in the other), thereby isolating a target urban area for loca-
tion, the specific site choices were clearly influenced by the availability
of sufficient property upon which to construct a modern facility -- property
cleared by a development organization. As stated above, I sense that the
responsiveness of these two firms to these opportunities may reflect the
heavy weight attached to space-related factors in their location decision
processes. However, on a more basic plane, firms may find site improve-
ment assistance attractive due to the difficulties which th face in attempt-
ing to acquire sufficient central city space upon which to build a facility
of meaningful proportions. That is, the development organization, due to
its power of eminent domain and so on, may be better equipped than is a
private firm to carry out a number of the tasks related to development of a
central city industrial site, as follows: assemble parcels of adjoining
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land into a usable industrial site; install services (e.g. water, electric);
and, relocate any persons or commercial establishments whose property
fell within the redevelopment zone. Without--the various powers held by
the development organization (which accrue from its close association
with the local government), a private firm would face substantial barriers
in attempting to develop an urban industrial site on its own.
Schmenner has made observations similar to those described above
with respect to the differential sensitivity of firms to financial and non-
financial incentives. In a survey of a large number of Fortune 500 firms
(42) he found that "physical help with site selection and new plant start
ups is used twice as often by large companies surveyed (61%) as is finan-
cial help (i.e. tax concessions, industrial revenue bonding) (31%). "7
IV. The Role of the Development Organization
(a) The Development Strategy
Research into the role of the development entity identified a complete-
ly unexpected phenomenon. Namely, the emphasis of the city develop-
ment agency in its efforts "to stimulate increased industrial employment" 8
by "attracting new business to the city" 9 is very heavily on the retention
of mobile -- relocating or expanding -- local firms. This reflects a con-
scious choice made by the development entity: "in the aftermath of the
7Schmenner, Summary of Findings, p. 18.
8 Economic Development and Industrial Corporation of Boston, Finan-
cial Assistance Programs, p. 1.
9Ibid., p. 1.
"flight to the sunbelt", . . nurturing young growth-oriented manufactur-
ing firms which draw upon native professional skills and an available
labor supply is a priority above attracting out-of-city and out-of-state
firms to locate there".10 The entry of "out-of-city" or "out-of-state"
firms is left to chance: If an "outsider" firm with expansion plans hap-
pens to express some interest in the community, then the incentives are
rolled out. However, there appears to be no effort to market the avail-
able programs to potential "outsider" locators. In an interview with a
representative of a Michigan development agency, the indication was
that if some firm decides on its own to locate in that general region of
the country, then the Michigan programs can have some impact. The im-
pression was that the incentives played no role in this choice of general
area. Evidence that this phenomenon occurs elsewhere comes from Rahe's
(35) survey in which . 6% of 159 respondent firms who were not previously
located in Denver but who established facilities there between 1965-1970,
"first became interested in Denver through contact with an industrial
development agency". 11
The "reindustrialization" successes achieved by the development
agencies reflect this focus. The vast majority of the central city indus-
trial projects are undertaken by firms already located within the city. In
Cleveland, this is true absolutely. In Boston, two cases of suburban-
10UDAG application by a development agency within one of the juris-
dictions under study.
11Charles P. Rahe, "Industrial Development Agencies and the Loca-
tion of New Plants", Growth and Change, (October 1972), p. 6.
based firms (from adjacent suburbs) locating facilities within the central
city were identified. In neither of these cases did incentive offerings
play a primary role in the firm's location decision -- although both uti-
lized them. At the state level, as referenced above, the Michigan survey
(33) indicated that 98.5% of the incentive users had at least one year of
experience operating a plant within the state -- although its marketing
program is much more sophisticated than that of the city agencies. Upon
discovering that the focus of the "redevelopment" effort was being expend-
ed upon local firms, the question of the local firm's purpose in utilizing
the incentives was pursued. As discussed above, it appears that very
few of these firms would alter a location decision if incentive opportuni-
ties were eliminated. (As already noted, twenty percent of Michigan sub-
sidy users indicated that they would cancel plans in this eventuality.)
Only one interviewed firm showed indications that the financial incentives
-- the key instrument in most development organizations' incentive port-
folios -- entered in as much as a "secondary" fashion. The incentives
are utilized by local firms because they would forego an opportunity to re-
duce costs by not utilizing them. In a majority of cases, therefore, the
development agency is expending funds (or reducing it's own future reve-
nue flows) to "attract" projects that would have been undertaken in any
event. Effectively then, the social benefits from the rare case in which
the incentive does, in fact, retain the project must outweigh the total
costs of all incentives/subsidies (i.e. inclusive of those provided to
firms for which the incentives had no influence on the location decision).
As the interviewee from the Michigan development organization indicat-
ed, the incentives cannot be offered to just those firms which considered
them to be essential to their choice of location. That is, unless some
mechanism can be developed which permits development agencies to
discriminate between those firms whose investments are contingent upon
the provision of incentives and those whose are not, it is likely that the
largest single incentive distribution will become the norm for all firms,
irrespective of the differential influence of the incentives on their loca-
tion decisions. Individual firms will not consider the differential import-
ance of incentives in the location decision processes of different firms
to be a valid justification for the provision of different subsidies to
firms undertaking equivalent projects. Irrespective of motivation, firms
will demand that equivalent investments be subsidized equally. Hence,
the incentive package assembled to attract that firm whose perspective
of the central city cost disadvantage was higher than that of any other
firm contemplating a similar project will become the norm for all firms
considering such projects.
Hence, the development strategy is best characterized as a defen-
sive one. My research was unable to uncover a single case in which a
firm located a plant within a central city with no prior experience in that
city or an adjacent community. The "redevelopment" process seems to be
one of slowing the "exodus" rather than reversing the trend through attract-
ing the expansion projects of "outsider" firms. To see this more clearly,
a Boston development agency -- in an application to a Federal agency for
development assistance -- notes that some 58,000 jobs were lost in Boston
between 1970 and 1977. Compare this with the 2,000 permanent new jobs
which are expected from the expansion described. in the chapter 2 example.
The expansions by the other large firms described above typically involve
300-400 expected new jobs. Additionally, some unusual trade-offs occur.
In the example from chapter 2, a number of small firms occupied the struc-
ture which is now being renovated to house the larger firm's expansion.
These firms had to relocate. Some relocated to newly renovated, property-
tax-exempt, city-owned manufacturing space, thereby increasing the net
subsidy cost of the primary project. In fact, a Federal grant of more than
$1 million was used to renovate this multi-story structure which has been
occupied completely by firms previously located within the same central
city -- with limited promises of incremental employment opportunities.
That is, the interview results indicate that the subsidy of small firm
relocations does not present much potential for expanded employment.
(b) The Development Strategy -- Estimated Cost Per "Created" Tob
Given this evaluation of the redevelopment strategy, it is of interest
to evaluate its effectiveness in terms of dollars expended per job created/
retained vis-a'-vis other programs designed to lessen unemployment in
"distressed areas". Data from a Michigan survey (34) of subsidized firms
in Detroit provides the foundation upon which to make such a comparison.
The data show that from 1974 to 1978, 1854 jobs were created through the
subsidy program and 24, 254 were retained. The cost of these subsidies
to the city is estimated to be approximately $5 million per year for an
95
average duration of twelve years. The present value of this stream --
discounted by the city's opportunity cost of funds -- represents the cost
of the benefits derived from those jobs actually created or retained as a
result of the provision of the subsidy. If the subsidy makes a real differ-
ence in 20% of the cases -- the highest estimate of effectiveness which
we have seen -- then the costs of all subsidies must be less than the
benefits of 370 new and 4,850 retained jobs (i.e. one-fifth of the totals
claimed by the city). The present value of this flow, discounted at a 10%
rate, is approximately $34 million or about $6,500 per "created" job (in
1978 dollars).
It is interesting to compare this result with estimates of the cost-
per-job-created of other employment-creation programs. In the National
Commission for Manpower Policy's Fourth Annual Report to the President
and the Congress (31) a comparison is made of the costs-per-created-job
of various public and private sector employment programs. The public
sector job creation programs (CETA Title VI and IID) provide 100% funding
to public employers. Title II was designed to be a "continuing program
targeted at selected areas experiencing substantial and persistent unem-
ployment. "12 Title VI was designed to be "a general countercyclical tool,
directed to what was believed to be a temporary downturn in the economy. 113
The private programs are primarily tax credit programs providing partial
12William Mirengoff and Lester Rindler, CETA: Manpower Programs
Under Local Control, (Washington, D.C., National Academy of Science,
1978), p. 8.
131bid., p. 8.
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subsidies to private employers for employment and training programs. The
work incentive (WIN) tax credit, passed originally in 1971, reimburses
private employers for a flat percentage (50%) of the first $6, 000 of the
first year's wages they pay to those receiving AFDC (aid to families with
dependent children) for 90 days or more. The credit is restricted such
that it applies only to low-wage workers. A lesser flat rate is applicable
to the second year's wages. A second private sector program is the tar-
geted jobs tax credit (TITC) which provides a subsidy structured in a very
similar way to the WIN program, although eligibility in this instance is
restricted to targeted groups (e.g. disadvantaged youth (18-24), disad-
vantaged Vietnam vets, and so on). The estimated costs per created job
of the two public sector programs (CETA Title VI and IID) were $10, 800 and
$11, 400 respectively. The private sector programs (TITC and WIN credit)
were $6, 250 and $10, 000 respectively (all figures in 1978 dollars). Hence,
the experience for the city of Detroit compares very favorably with these
programs. That is, it appears to be at least as cost efficient as these
other employment-creation programs.
(c) The Development Strategy - Summary
It is interesting to note the level of efficiency which the retention
strategy must achieve simply to maintain the status quo with respect to
employment levels -- let alone to re-employ those who have lost jobs due
to the "exodus". Under the retention strategy, maintenance of the status
quo can be achieved in one of two ways:
- retention of every job already present within the jurisdiction; or
- retention of local-firm expansion activity (note: many of these
firms may be in low-growth or no-growth phases) supplemented by chance
"outsider" entries such that at least as many new jobs are created as are
lost through any failures to retain existing jobs.
I claim that, given the above evidence, it is unlikely that simple main-
tenance of the status quo with respect to employment levels is achiev-
able through the application of the retention strategy in either sense just
described.
Furthermore, note that this retention strategy is dependent upon the
firm to make an initial, "primary" location choice in favor of the target
community; a choice which the interview evidence indicates is uninflu-
enced by incentives offered through the community's development agency.
That is, there were no cases uncovered by this author in which incentives
had an impact on the "primary" location decision. Each firm was interest-
ed in a target locality for reasons independent of the incentives (note:
this applies to both the urban-based and suburban-based firms). The key
point is that a defensive, retention strategy of this sort does not appear
-- from the interview evidence -- to impact the "primary" selection of a
set of viable location alternatives by either local firms or those from
"out-of-state" or "out-of-city".
Finally, it seems unlikely that a large number of "outsider" firms
will be motivated to locate a facility within the central city on the basis
of a "social commitment" to the provision of employment opportunities
within same. A fairly direct reading on the extent to which "socially
responsible activities" serve as viable alternative corporate objectives
can be gained through a review of statistics on corporate charitable con-
tributions. The Conference Board conducts an annual survey of corporate
charitable activities and publishes the results along with IRS statistics
on the level of corporate contributions nationwide (57). The law permits
a corporate tax deduction of up to 5% of net income for corporate contri-
butions to charitable causes. Yet, the national average for corporate
contributions has hovered around 1% of pretax income since the early 1950's
(e.g. 1951 - .78%; 1964 - 1.13%; 1977 - .98%).14 The Conference Board's
1977 survey (whose participants account for 35% of the charitable contri-
bution total for the year) found that: 36% of participating firms contribute
.49% or less of pretax income; 49% contribute between .5% and 1.99%;
10% between 2% and 3.99%; and, 5% over 4%.15 The average contribution
for this group is 1.25% of pretax income and the standard deviation is 1.5%.
Furthermore, the results show that charitable contributions as a percent of
pretax income are inversely related to income. For example, in 1977, the
median contribution percentage for firms with pretax income of $10 - $25
million was .93% while the median for firms with pretax income of $250 -
$500 million was .33%.16 Ninety percent of this latter group contributed
14Kathryn Troy, Annual Survey of Corporate Contributions, 1977, (New
York, N.Y., The Conference Board, 1979), p. 3.
15Ibid., p. 10.
16Ibid., p. 11.
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less than .75% of their pretax income. These data indicate that there are
very few firms contributing anywhere near the maximum deductible of 5%.
Since this 5% tax deduction provision provides a low cost mechanism
through which firms could satisfy "social responsibility" objectives, one
would expect to see many more firms at the 5% level were such objectives
held pervasively. The implication of the very low rate of utilization of
this opportunity at the 5% level is that "social responsibility" objectives
play an insignificant role for most firms, particularly among the higher
income firms from whom one would expect a greater expansion potential
and hence, a greater demand for new sites. The conclusion drawn by
this author is that there are very few firms in the market for an opportunity
to make "social commitment" investments in plant.
(d) Information Availability
The issue of information availability (regarding the characteristics of
a community or of any available incentives) to "outsider" firms is an im-
portant one. That is, if "outsiders" have no ready source of information
regarding a community, then few would be expected to consider it as a
viable location alternative, especially if the interview finding that firms
do not carry out particularly rigorous location searches accurately reflects
the behavior of most firms. In the Boston case, there is little evidence
that the firms which eventually did business with a development organi-
zation were made aware of the incentive programs through any direct com-
munication initiated by the development organization itself. In fact, one
interviewee claimed that his staff was not specifically aware of the avail-
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ability of incentives within the jurisdiction of desired investment, but
hypothesized (correctly) that, due to the social/political environment in
general, subsidies would be available. On this basis, the firm undertook
to search them out. Firms were typically made aware of the existence of
the incentive programs through a banking or real estate contract. Rahe
(35), as referenced above, found that only .6% of "outsider" locators in
Denver first became interested in the city through contact with a develop-
ment agency. Only 1.3% felt that a development agency was the most
important source of information. This lack of information flowing to firms
at the local level leads this author to conclude that extra-regional firms
would be totally ignorant of any incentive opportunities.
I believe that this information issue may provide the link between
the hypothetical example presented in chapter 2 and the empirical find-
ings described in this chapter. That is, although all interviewed firms --
save the one which made an explicit urban/suburban cost comparison --
claimed that the incentives did not influence their location decision in a
significant way, the incentive packages assembled for two of these firms
(one urban-based, one suburban-based) resemble one of the incentive com-
binations found to be sufficient to overcome the urban/suburban NPV dif-
ferential in the hypothetical example; (specifically, combination #19 from
the chapter 2 example provides the closest match). If one infers from
this similarity that these "real world" incentive packages were of signi-
ficant value to these firms, then their disclaimer as to the importance of
the incentive packages in their location decision processes appears to be
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something of a puzzle. I claim that this puzzle is easily resolved if one
considers the actual sequence of events in both of these decisions. That
is, in each case, the location decision predated the negotiation of a
specific incentive package and since these two packages were negotiated
at approximately the same time and were the first of their kind in the com-
munity, neither firm would have been able to anticipate with any certainty
the value of the final arrangements. Of interest, therefore, is the firm
which made its urban investment contingent upon the provision of a size-
able subsidy (the case described at the end of chapter 2) and which nego-
tiated its incentive package approximately one year after these two firms
finalized their incentive arrangements. This chain of events may show
that, once information regarding the potential value of incentive combina-
tions reaches mobile firms, the incentives then exert a greater influence
on the location decision process; an influence which one might anticipate
given the results .of the hypothetical chapter 2 example regarding such
combinations. By definition, firms acquiring such information only after
negotiating a specific incentive package would have to claim that the in-
centives did not play a significant role in their location decisions. That
is, this claim would not represent a contradiction even in cases in which
the final incentive arrangements were of substantial value to the firm if
the firm had been given no prior indication as to the potential value of
such incentive arrangements. It is possible, therefore, that future empir-
ical study of this issue may find that firms having had prior knowledge of
the value of various incentive combination opportunities had undertaken
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central city projects primarily in response to the availability of such
opportunities. The case example referred to above (in which the firm
stated up front that a subsidy of a specific size would be required to re-
tain the investment in the central city) may signal the start of such acti-
vity. The recently announced pla'ns for a General Motors plant in Detroit
(in which it is estimated that some 40% of the project start-up costs will
be covered by various incentive programs) 17 provides another example in
which a firm has indicated that it will undertake a central city project if
sufficient incentives are provided.
Locational incentives have been in existence for some time. It may
be that they have only recently been combined in such ways as to repre-
sent attractive opportunities for mobile firms not otherwise interested in
undertaking central city projects. That is, a single incentive vehicle, in
and of itself, may not be sufficient to overcome a locational disadvantage
of some sort, yet combinations of same (and the diffusion of knowledge
regarding the availability of such combinations) may be sufficient. (Note:
the incentive packages provided to the other firms studied by this author
were of the single-incentive variety (of standard proportions), hence, the
disclaimers cr these firms as to the influvn-e of incentives in their loca-
tion decision processes are in accord with expectations created by the
hypothetical chapter 2 exercise with respect to the potential effectiveness
of incentive instruments of standard proportions employed individually.)
17William Serrin, "Huge New G.M. Plant, Like Many, to Get Subsi-
dies", The New York Times, (Feb. 25, 1981).
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(e) The Negotiating Process
One aspect of the topic which has not been discussed extensively
in the literature is the bargaining process which goes on between the
development agency and the mobile firm. The amount of funds to be raised,
the type of instrument(s) to be utilized, the wording in the various federal
grant or loan applications, the timing and amount of interest repayments,
the amount of property taxes, any special lease arrangements if an IRB
is involved (e.g. hiring practices, amount and timing of lease payments,
options for purchasing the property and so on), are all areas which are
commonly negotiated between the agency and the locating firm. The inter-
view data indicate that this process was typically a drawn out affair and
hence, costly. It appears that much negative publicity (regarding pro-
ject delays attributed to the development agency) circulated within the
industrial community as a result of the difficulties encountered by one of
the suburban-based firms in the start-up of its central city plant. Another
firm indicated that -- due to the development organization's lack of under-
standing with respect to the operation of the incentive programs -- they
were forced to do much "innovating" in putting together an incentive pack-
age. This is the urban-based firm which had stated that an urban site
would be selected over a suburban alternative only with the provision of
an incentive package of certain value. The interviewee for this firm --
head financial officer -- reported that the central city project would not
have been undertaken had he had prior knowledge of the time delays that
he would encounter in the negotiating process.
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One of the smaller firms in the interview sample indicated that two
years were spent in preliminary discussions of lease and loan conditions
for one particular project. In this case, the city was owner of a ware-
house property being renovated to accommodate light industry. The city
was to provide heat and electric capacity. Basic experience with such
undertakings was manifested through such events as the provision of
electric capacity only sufficient to service office space -- i.e. not suffi-
cient for light industry. Hence, although incentives are available, the
firm-specific package requires much negotiation which translates into a
large investment of time on the firm's part. The implication is that time
delays cost the firm money. That is, a year of lost revenues might easily
exceed the benefits derived from an incentive opportunity -- negotiation
of which may have caused the delay.
A rough estimate of the relative value of time delays vis-a-vis incen-
tives can be made through a return to the framework of the hypothetical
example presented in chapter 2. In that example, the present value of
the base-case, urban, after-tax, operating flows was some $4,402,000
in period O terms. If this stream of operating flows was delayed one year,
such that the first such flow occurred in year 2 rather than year i, and
assuming no change in the firm's debt obligations, the firm would exper-
ience a loss of $316, 000 in period O terms due to the delayed receipt of
this stream of income and depreciation tax shield inflows. Compare this
figure to the $279, 000 present value of the incentive opportunity which
provided for a 50% cut in property taxes for 12 years in the hypothetical
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chapter 2 exercise (assumption #2). This example indicates that the cost
of project delays could nullify a large portion of the advantage gained
through the provision of subsidies. Due to the potential impact on pro-
ject value of such time delays, development organizations would be well
advised to expedite the negotiation process. This also implies that, to
the extent that the development organization commits itself to some role
in the actual construction of the facility, it should ensure that time de-
lays do not result from its failure to live up to these promises.
(f) Game Theory Revisited
The interview work completed for purposes of this paper provides
some further insights into the game-like aspects of the location decision
process. First, firms making investments in facilities located within an
unfamiliar region will experience some degree of uncertainty with respect
to the cost outcomes of operating at that particular site. To the firm, this
uncertainty represents risk, hence it will require a greater promised re-
turn from projects characterized by some degree of uncertainty than from
those not so characterized. That is, the incentives must be sufficient to
cover any additional costs assigned by the firm to uncertainty. A rational
response for the development organization to make would be to reduce this
uncertainty through the provision of information to the firm. However, as
Spence (47) observes in his analysis of "market signalling", the informa-
tion provider "presumably. . .will manipulate this image to create favor-
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able impressions" .8 Hence, it is likely that the information receiver --
a mobile firm in this case -- will discount this flow of information due
to the likelihood of inaccuracies.
A second insight into these game-like aspects of the process involves
the various "threat" strategies which firms may employ in order to maxi-
mize the inflow of incentive funds. There appear to be two variations on
this theme: 1) a local firm threatening to leave the community unless sub-
sidies of a specific size are provided; and, 2) an "outsider" firm playing
one community off against another in order to gain a maximum subsidy in-
flow. The point is that it is very difficult to distinguish between those
firms which are bluffing and those which are in fact sensitive to the pro-
vision of a subsidy.
A final variable is the role of the Federal government. As discussed
in many passages above, the local development organization receives a
substantial portion of its incentive funds from various Federal agencies.
The local development agency's ability to provide incentives of sufficient
size to influence the location decisions of mobile firms is clearly contin-
gent upon the availability of Federal monies. Changes in Federal policy
-- such as those manifest at this point in time -- could easily make the
game substantially less interesting to play,
18A. Michael Spence, Market Signalling: Informational Transfer in
Hiring and Related Screening Processes, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard
University Press, 1974), p. 3.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Review of Findings
Manufacturing employment within older, American industrial centers
has been on the decline for years. City and state governments represent-
ing these jurisdictions have responded by developing locational incentive
programs designed to attract industry. These incentives take a number of
forms: (1) financial instruments which may be supported by either federal,
state or local funding; and, (2) "non-financial" instruments such as labor
training programs which again may be supported by either federal, state
or local funds. The primary financial instruments employed by "redevel-
opment" authorities are: property tax concessions, low interest rate
(concessionary) loans, loan guarantees and tax-exempt industrial reve-
nue bonds (IRB's). The non-financial instruments most commonly en-
countered in this author's research were: the assembly of parcels of
urban land into industrial sites sufficient to meet the needs of modern
industry; the renovation of obsolete urban buildings so as to provide a
supply of manufacturing space meeting modern standards; and labor
training progra ms.
A primary thrust of this research was to explore the attractiveness
of these incentives from the perspective of the firm. As one element in
this exploration, the analytical framework provided by modern finance
theory (specifically the adjusted-present-value technique of project
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valuation) was applied to model the value of each incentive instrument
from the firm's perspective. A hypothetical exercise based upon these
models provided an indication of the likely impact of these incentives in
the "real world". The hypothetical exercise drew upon information gath-
ered by this author as well as work completed by Hamer (10) on the com-
parative costs of constructing and operating a plant in an urban and a
suburban environment. This comparative cost information was utilized to
"construct" two hypothetical plants -- one located at an urban site, one
at a suburban site. The exercise includes estimates of both start-up and
operating costs at each site. The result is that, assuming an initial
absence of incentives, the net present value (NPV) of the suburban plant
exceeds that of the urban plant by about $600, 000 (about 18%), assuming:
a 25 year plant life, a real discount rate of 7%, revenues of $5 million
per year, an urban labor cost advantage of 7.5%, and an amount of debt
approximately equal to one-half of urban start-up costs (see chapter 2).
A number of incentives were then evaluated in this context. The follow-
ing conclusions were reached:
- That given measurements of "real world" cost differentials be-
tween typical urban and suburban sites, the NPV differential between the
suburban and non-subsidized urban sites is likely to be substantial.
- That, taken individually, incentives do not appear to be power-
ful enough to overcome this differential unless they are of a size far beyond
that which could be characterized as typical within the world of contem-
porary incentive programs.
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- That certain combinations of incentives may be powerful enough
to overcome the differential.
A second element in the exploration of the attractiveness of these in-
centive programs involved a series of interviews with representatives of
firms which had been recent recipients of incentives. As one would ex-
pect, firms consider a number of basic factors (e.g. availability of land,
availability of space, proximity to suppliers) in making their plant loca-
tion decisions. As described above, redevelopment authorities attempt
to influence these decisions by supplementing the basic factor-endow-
ments of the areas targeted for redevelopment through the introduction of
new factors uniquely available within these areas, viz, the various in-
centives. The interviews provide evidence' as to those factors which play
a significant role in firms' location decisions. Interestingly, the weights
attached to the various locational factors seemed to be unique for each
firm. Only two factors appeared to be weighted heavily by all firms in
the interview sample: space considerations (i.e. either vacant land
of certain minimum proportions or existing building space of certain mini-
mum proportions); and, workforce considerations. These firms' location
decisions were dominated by considerations of the basic, traditional lo-
cational factors and not by incentives. There were only a few instances
in which the activity of a redevelopment organization was deemed to have
had some influence on a location decision (e.g. one firm in the interview
sample built an urban plant on a site assembled by a redevelopment au-
thority which, through its exercise of its power of eminent domain, was
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able to pull together a number of small contiguous parcels of land). The
evidence assembled by this author also indicates that a large majority
of incentive-recipient firms are firms already maintaining operations with-
in or proximate to the community from which the incentives emanate.
Finally, the firms in the interview sample generally did not undertake an
extensive search for alternative locations.
The conclusion to be drawn from these observations is that a size-
able fraction of the incentive dollar is expended on firms whose location
decisions are not significantly influenced by the receipt of these subsi-
dies. The results of a State of Michigan survey (33) of incentive-recipient
firms demonstrate this inefficiency inherent within an incentive program
which expends most of its incentive resources on local firm activity; the
results are that only 20% of these subsidized firms indicated that they
would cancel plans for expansion within the State were the primary in-
centive instrument -- a property tax concession -- not available. Some
98.5% of these firms had at least 1 year of previous operating experience
within the State.
The predominance of local firms in the population of incentive-
recipient firms reinforces the observation made by this author that con-
temporary redevelopment organizations manifest a "defensive" redevelop-
ment strategy which depends primarily upon influencing local-firm
relocations and expansions to offset the unemployment problems created
by the out-migration of local industry. That is, development organizations
appear to expend little energy in marketing their incentive programs to
mobile, extra-local firms. Further manifesting this defensive strategy
is one case encountered by this author in which the role of redevelopment
entrepreneur was taken on by-the firm rather than by a redevelopment au-
thority. In this case, a firm's management hypothesized that, due to the
general cultural climate of the times, incentives-to-industry programs
would exist. On the basis of this hypothesis the firm undertook a search
(successful of course) for such programs.
As a result of the employment of this defensive strategy, the entry
of extra-local firms to a community attempting to effect redevelopment
becomes a rare and, in effect, a chance event. Yet, it is this popula-
tion of extra-local firms which can provide real, incremental employment
opportunities to the community since, absent incentive opportunities of
sizeable proportions, these firms would most likely not consider an older
urban community as a viable plant location alternative. The point is,
incentive-to-industry programs will be more efficient the greater is the
proportion of total incentive expenditures which flows to extra-local firms
which would not otherwise consider an investment in plant within the com-
munity and the lesser is the proportion of total incentive expenditures
which flows to local firms which, by definition, are already familiar with
the community and its factor-endowments and, as such, would tend to
undertake projects within the community even in the absence of locational
incentives.
This focus on local-firm activity can lead to some other forms of in-
efficiency. In one case encountered in my research, a large urban-based
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firm selected an older urban building to house a major expansion of its
manufacturing operations. A number of smaller firms maintaining opera-
tions within the building had to relocate. Interestingly, some moved
from the original property to a structure owned by the city where they be-
came the recipients of a property tax concession. Hence, a by-product
of the principal project -- which was partially financed with a multi-
million dollar federal grant -- was an incentive expenditure on firms mak-
ing intra-urban relocations.
Finally, it should be noted that it is very difficult for redevelopment
authorities to distinguish between those urban firms whose location deci-
sions are truly sensitive to incentives and those whose are not. Consider
the following illustration. Assume that two urban firms approach a re-
development organization and claim (or threaten) that they will be forced
to relocate to the suburbs (or elsewhere) unless an incentive package of
certain proportions is assembled to help defray the greater costs of con-
structing and operating an urban facility. Assume also that one firm is
sincere in its claim and one is bluffing (i.e. it will undertake the urban
project even in the event that it does not receive an incentive). The
point is, it is quite unlikely that the redevelopment organization would
be able to distinguish between the sincere and the bluffing firms. To com-
plicate matters further, even if the development organization could develop
some mechanism with which to distinguish between the two types of firms,
considerations of equity might require that firms undertaking similar pro-
jects receive similar subsidies. Since it is likely that there will continue
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to be some firms which would choose to establish facilities within a
"distressed" urban community even in the event that incentives were un-
available, and since equity may require that development authorities pro-
vide similar incentives to firms undertaking similar projects within these
communities irrespective of the factor(s) motivating individual firm's
decisions (notwithstanding the difficulties involved in ascertaining these
motivations), then there will continue to be some fraction of the incentive
dollar expended on firms whose decisions are not influenced by the re-
ceipt of an incentive subsidy. That is, some inefficiency will remain.
The goal, therefore, is to increase the number of truly incremental job
opportunities created per incentive dollar expended. One way to achieve
this goal is to attract firms which clearly would not consider a "distressed"
community as a viable plant location alternative independent of the pro-
vision of an incentive subsidy; by definition, extra-local firms fit this
criterion.
A Policy Recommendation for the Redevelopment Organization
Clearly, the observations outlined above indicate that those commu-
nities truly committed to a redevelopment bid would benefit from instruct-
ing their redevelopment authorities to adopt a more aggressive strategy
with respect to marketing their incentive programs to extra-local firms.
We have seen that a redevelopment strategy which focuses strongly on
the retention of local firm activity is inefficient in that a large proportion
of the incentive dollar flows to fir'ms whose location decisions are not
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significantly impacted by the availability of such subsidies, but which
may not pass-up the opportunity to become the recipient of the subsidy
since it represents a chance to reduce the burden borne by the firm to
finance the project. Hence, a greater efficiency would derive from at-
tracting a large pool of extra-local firms through the provision of incen-
tives sufficient to overcome the cost disadvantages which these firms
would face in constructing and operating facilities in "distressed" urban
communities vis-a'-vis facilities located at the firms' most preferred sites.
As was described above, the hypothetical exercise developed by this
author indicates that the incentives sufficient to overcome the cost dis-
advantages which characterize urban operations will be large. In that
exercise the urban cost disadvantage amounted to some 25% of the start-
up costs of an alternative suburban site. Another indication of the
requisite size of incentives sufficient to support meaningful redevelop-
ment projects comes from a General Motors project just underway in
Detroit which is slated to receive public subsidies equivalent to 40% of
start-up costs -- a transfer of some $320 million in this case. Hence, a
community committed to a truly meaningful redevelopment effort based
upon a conventional incentives-to-industry strategy will have to be very
well funded.
Upon the assembly of the requisite pool of incentive funds, informa-
tion describing the various incentive opportunities would have to be dif-
fused to mobile, extra-local firms. Given the likelihood that firms
receiving such information would discount it due to their perception that
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the community would have manipulated the information so as to project
as favorable an image as possible (see Spence (47)), development organ-
izations would have to back up their claims with specific examples of
incentive packages which they had put together. (Note: some of the
development agencies whose representatives were interviewed by this
author do prepare project summaries, so the issue is primarily one of the
distribution of this information to extra-local firms.)
Review of Development Agency Strategy and Resource Endowments
Although the above strategy is rather obvious, it does not appear to
be widely practiced. Redevelopment organizations have been in existence
for some time and it is possible that many have reviewed strategies simi-
lar to that described above, yet have not been able to implement them.
My impression, from the interviews, is that these organizations either
have not made the commitment or do not have the resources sufficient to
undertake redevelopment programs as ambitious as that recommended
above. For example, the redevelopment effort in Cleveland has been a
particularly limited one; so limited in fact that the City's development
agencies were funding projects in the late 1970's with Urban Renewal
funds received by the City many years earlier. Changes in the Cleveland
local political scene during the 1970's may account for this relative lack
of redevelopment activity. One Cleveland mayoral administration in par-
ticular cultivated a very unfavorable "business climate". A number of
local councilmen failed to gain reelection during thi-s period largely (it is
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said) due to their support of tax concession programs for local industry!
In Boston, the City's major redevelopment organ -- the Economic Devel-
opment and Industrial Corporation (EDIC) -- undertook very few projects
until the late 1970's although the agency was established early in the
decade. Even now, the EDIC's policy with respect to the scope of its
redevelopment effort is to focus heavily on local firm activity. Finally,
Michigan's Office of Economic Development has been in existence for
thirty years, yet the interviewee from this organization claimed that the
organization's only opportunities to successfully attract extra-regional
firms occurs when these firms have chosen -- for reasons independent
of the availability of incentives -- to locate facilities in a Midwestern
industrial state. Michigan's key incentive program -- a property tax
concession -- was adopted in 1974 with the hope that it would provide
the State with a differential advantage vis-5a-vis its neighbors in those
cases where extra-regional firms expressed an interest in the region. Con-
trary to my initial expectations, most of Michigan's tax concessions have
been extended to local firms, as noted above. Some 80% of the firms re-
ceiving these subsidies in Michigan claim that the subsidies did not
significantly influence their location decisions, a fact which highlights
the inefficiency inherent in a redevelopment strategy which focuses pri-
marily on the retention of local firm activity.
One can infer, therefore, that the development agencies in the inter-
view sample have either not made the commitment or posses the resources
sufficient to extend their programs to include extra-local firms. Given the
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results of the above described hypothetical exercise -- which indicated that
very large subsidies will be required to overcome the cost disadvantages of
urban operation -- we would not be surprised to find that localities did not
possess resources sufficient to support ambitious redevelopment efforts,
even if these localities desired to undertake such efforts. Once again, the
GM-Detroit project provides a useful reference. That is, this project dem-
onstrates the size of the local commitment of resources which a meaningful
redevelopment effort would involve, viz, up to $120 million or about one-
third of the total subsidy for this project will be covered by a tax concession.
Clearly, localities will face financial limits as to the number of pro-
jects of meaningful proportions which they can support with local resources.
The Federal Government represents the primary source of alternative fund-
ing. However, Federal resources are also not without limit. For example,
HUD's Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) program -- a key Federal
tool for providing, financial assistance to the urban redevelopment effort
-- was funded with more than $600 million in 1980. If one used the esti-
mated UDAG subsidy to the GM-Detroit project of $30 million as a bench-
mark, it is reasonable to assume that this supply of Federal funds -- a
generous supply which reflects a plateau of national political support for
urban redevelopment -- would fall short of demand. As of this writing,
it is clear that the political winds have changed. The Reagan administra-
tion desires to trim the budgets of the Federal redevelopment programs now
in place. In fact, it is possible that, just as we have begun to observe
Federal funding of incentive programs of proportions sufficient to finance
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ambitious redevelopment efforts, the Federal funds which were appro-
priated during the Carter administration to support such efforts will dis-
appear.
A Second Policy Recommendation for the Redevelopment Organization
It is this author's opinion that it is not to be concluded that relative-
ly resource-poor redevelopment organizations are totally without the
capacity to attract extra-local firms. That is, there are alternative strat-
egies which these organizations might employ to attract these firms.
This author's interviews provide evidence which support Schmenner's
(40) and (42) claim that industries may be categorized by the weights
which they assign to the various locational factors. For example, Schmen-
ner indicates that firms in the apparel, leather, furniture and consumer
electronics industries would consider labor costs to be a primary control-
ling concern in their location decisions. Printing, plastics fabrication
and can making industries would be primarily concerned with proximity
to markets due to their sensitivity to transportation costs under Schmen-
ner's framework. Schmenner's work goes on to review a number of other
industries. My research provides some further examples as well. For
instance, the high-technology firms in my interview sample were quite
sensitive to the existence of organized labor. This sensitivity seems to
stem from these firms' perception that the rapid technological change
which characterizes the industry requires that they retain the flexibility
on the plant floor which a non-union environment provides. Along another
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dimension, high growth firms in the interview sample were quite concerned
with the availability of proximate vacant space upon which to locate
future plant expansions. The availability of a labor supply sufficient to
man these future expansions was also an important consideration for these
high growth firms. (Note: these categorizations do not imply that each
firm in any given industry will heavily weight the factor(s) isolated in an
analysis such as Schmenner's.)
The thrust of this recommendation is for redevelopment authorities to
concentrate the resources which they do possess on incentive programs
designed specifically to attract firms within industries which would con-
sider the redevelopment community's existing factor endowment(s) to be
attractive as well. It is a strategy of playing to one's existing strengths.
If the community represented by a redevelopment authority can be charac-
terized by some set of positive locational factor endowments (e.g. a sur-
plus of skilled labor and proximity to major Midwestern consumer markets
as in Cleveland's case), then the resources at the redevelopment author-
ity's command can be used to support incentive programs which would be
attractive to the same varieties of firms which would be attracted to the
existing factor endowments. That is, the incentive programs would be
designed to complement the existing factor endowments. Hence, given
the example of the Cleveland endowments, a Cleveland redevelopment
organization (after referencing research work such as Schnienner's to
identify those industries which might find the City's existing factor endow-
ments attractive) would want to focus all of its resources on incentive
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programs which would address any major concerns of firms in such indus-
tries which would not be satisfied by the existing factor endowments. As
Schmenner's work suggests, the apparel, furniture and consumer electron-
ics industries would be candidates for Cleveland given our assumptions
of its factor endowments. If, due to its growth potential, the consumer
electronics industry is targeted by the City's redevelopment authorities,
then they would be well advised to focus their redevelopment resources
on assembling parcels of urban land sufficient to meet the present and
(due to the industry's growth perspective) future expansion needs. Once
such a focused effort had been undertaken, information describing the
total package of beneficial endowments and incentive factors would be
distributed nationally to firms in the target industry.
There is no evidence to be drawn from this author's interviews which
suggests that contemporary redevelopment organizations attempt to seg-
ment the universe of industries in the manner just described. It is not
surprising, therefore, that there is also no evidence that these organiza-
tions specialize with respect to their incentive offerings in order to attract
firms within a specific subset of industries. Nevertheless, development
organizations might achieve greater success by specializing in this
fashion, rather than spreading their resources across a number of incen-
tives which may not provide a sufficient inducement to extra-local firms
in any industries. The greater this focus on extra-local firms, the greater
will be the efficiency with which the incentive dollar is utilized, i.e. the
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greater will be the number of truly incremental job opportunities created
per incentive dollar expended.
The National Perspective
Another area of research pursued by this author was to evaluate the
various incentive instruments from the perspective of the development
organization itself. As noted above, a number of programs are federally
funded (e.g. HUD's UDAG program) and others place the primary burden
on local public finances (e.g. property tax concession programs). Some
are reserved exclusively for urban redevelopment (UDAG) and others are
accessible by many community (IRB's). This multiplicity of funding sources
permits many communities -- not just those interested in effecting indus-
trial redevelopment -- to develop an incentives-to-industry program. As
a result of this phenomenon, urban communities attempting to effect re-
development may not only have to overcome the general cost disadvantage
attributable to operating a facility in an urban environment vis-a'-vis, for
example, a suburb, but may also have to overcome an extra barrier in some
cases, viz, an incentive instrument offered to industry by a nearby suburb-
an community; a suburb which may also hold a natural operating cost ad-
vantage over the urban community. This phenomenon makes redevelopment
all the more expensive, perhaps prohibitively so given the resources of
any one urban community whose revenue base has already been eroded by
the out-migration of industry.
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One case encountered in this research demonstrates how this inter-
community competition for industry can drive up the cost of redevelopment.
The case involves an urban-based firm which was considering a major
plant expansion. The firm (which desired to geographically cluster its
operations as tightly as possible) had two location alternatives available
to it. One option involved the renovation of an older central city structure.
Due to the IRS' restrictions on the issue of IRB's by a single community
within which a firm has made capital expenditures which exceed a certain
ceiling (see chapter 1), the central city under consideration could only
offer to float a $1 million IRB to assist the firm. However, if the firm
split its expansion three ways, locating one new facility in each of three
suburban communities (its second option), then -- since the IRS' capital
expenditure ceilings would not be exceeded -- it could receive a $10
million IRB from each suburb. The central city in this case applied for
and received a multi-million dollar grant from the Federal Government to
cover the basic operating cost disadvantage plus the value of the net in-
centive-disadvantage. The IRB's, due to their federal tax exemption,
are a drain on federal tax revenues. Likewise, the direct grant is clearly
an outflow from the federal perspective. Hence, the existence of one
federal incentive instrument (IRB's) placed an urban community at a dis-
advantage in the inter-community competition for industry, requiring that
another federal instrument be utilized to effect a balance. - The inefficien-
cy from the national perspective is manifest.
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One conclusion to draw from such observations is that the redevel-
opment effort should be centralized, giving a Federal body the power to
allocate projects to "distressed" communities as it saw fit. The purpose
of such a Federal body would be to establish some order in the allotment
of funds across needy communities. The aim would be to reduce that com-
petition which does occur between redevelopment organizations and, hence,
reduce the inefficiencies inherent in such competition.
It may also be that the assumption of responsibility for redevelopment
policy nationwide by a Federal body would serve to increase the effi-
ciency of the total effort in another, perhaps more important, way. We
have seen that local redevelopment organizations focus a majority of the
resources available to them (from both federal and local sources) on local
firm relocation and expansion activity, perhaps due to their inability to
accumulate funds sufficient to undertake an ambitious program of attract-
ing extra-local firms, perhaps due -- in turn -- simply to the great ex-
pense involved in such an effort. To the extent that a federal organization
is equipped both to provide incentives sufficient to overcome the greater
costs of constructing and operating a facility in an urban environment and
to focus a greater proportion of its expenditures on projects which bring
real incremental jobs to a community, overall efficiency per incentive
dollar expended is improved.
A centralized redevelopment effort may produce other by-products. As
one interviewee from a redevelopment organization noted, these organiza-
tions offer a wide range of incentives because competitive organizations
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in nearby communities provide such a broad assortment and so on, the
perception being that it is to an organization's detriment to not offer a
"competitive line" of inducements. Adopting a uniform, national approach
to redevelopment might serve to reduce these "peer" pressures and com-
mensurately, to reduce the pressures which have been placed on local
public finances to fund the redevelopment effort.
I sense that a national program of this variety would not be without
its difficulties. The essence of such a program would be to transfer from
the local to the national level the decision as to the extent to which the
older industrial centers continue to serve as viable centers of industrial
activity. Clearly, localities will not respond favorably to a reduction in
their ability to develop and direct the redevelopment programs which im-
pact their jurisdictions. Martin and Leone (23) note this as well: "In
formulating a federal strategy, national policy makers may well decide that
it is the responsibility of federal economic policies to reconcile where
possible the contradictions between regional and national development
objectives. . . . Thus, a local government may not have full control over
the destiny of its own geographic area. "
I believe that the Federal government -- short of a program which
would preempt local authority entirely, as just described -- has avail-
able to it alternative methods by which to exert a strong influence over
the national dynamics of incentive-to-industry programs. These alterna-
ICurtis H. Martin and Robert A. Leone, Local Economic Development,
(Lexington, Mass., D.C. Heath and Co., 1977), p.. 1ll.
125
tives would focus on a Federal government effort to increase the size of
the differential between the Federal incentive funding accessible by
"economically-distressed" and economically- strong commnunities. For
example, the right to issue IRB's could be reserved for "distressed" com-
munities. So as to not place a greater burden on Federal revenues, the
IRS' single-issue IRB ceilings could be revised upward such that under
the new policy, the total, annual, national issue of IRB's would not change
from its present level. Furthermore, the national tax code could be re-
vised so that firms locating in "distressed" communities would be able
to greatly accelerate the depreciation of new plant and equipment and/or
apply very generous investment tax credit provisions compared with facili-
ties located in economically-strong communities. Interestingly, as of
this writing, the Reagan administration -- which, as noted above, desires
to eliminate the $600+ million per year UDAG program -- has indicated that
it would like to e.xperiment with a tax concession program based on the
location of industry in urban "enterprise zones". The proposal calls for
a tax concession to be extended to firms that either move to or stay in a
neighborhood with twice the national rate of unemployment and 30% of its
residents living below the poverty line. Of interest, therefore, is whether
this program will provide for tax concessions sizeable enough to provide
a sufficient incentive to industry to locate in these- neighborhoods, (i. e.
large enough to overcome the cost disadvantages of operating within these
communities).
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Conclusions and Areas for Further Research
I believe that the key contribution offered by this paper is the analysis
demonstrating that incentives can influence the location decisions of
firms if the incentives are of a size sufficient to overcome any start-up
and operating cost disadvantages which characterize the community tar-
geted for redevelopment. Although my research indicates that, taken
individually, incentives of conventional proportions do not provide an in-
centive of sufficient size, combinations of such instruments can provide
a total inducement of the appropriate proportions. It should be noted,
however, that the cost of such incentives-to-industry programs may be
far greater than the funds practically available for this purpose.
The above discussion of the policy issues from a national perspective
provides an indication of the nature of the economic and political complex-
ities which characterize the formulation of an effective and efficient
"redevelopment" process. The most fruitful focus for further research, I
believe, would involve an evaluation of the various policy alternatives,
available at the national level. I have already introduced two such alter-
natives, one which would call for preemption of redevelopment authority
by the Federal government, a second which would maintain some power
at the local level but would involve a readjustment of the structure of
existing Federal incentive instruments (e.g. revising national tax policy
as it pertains to the issuance of IRB's) such that urban "enterprise zones"
could access a greater volume of Federal incentive funding vis-a-vis an
economically-strong community. Alternatives such as these represent only
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a limited change in the focus of the redevelopment effort, i.e., they are
based upon incentives-to-industry programs and implicitly assume that
the best solution to the unemployment problems which now face the older
industrial communities is to reestablish the viability of these communities
as strong centers of industrial activity. There exist more radical alterna-
tives: programs which provide direct subsidies to urban laborers to cover
the costs of commuting to suburban jobs; programs which provide direct
subsidies to urban laborers to cover the costs of their relocation to other
regions of the country.
I believe that the evaluation of the economic and political ramifica-
tions of alternatives such as those described above provides an important
area for future research. Such research may show that such alternative
strategies are not characterized by the inefficiencies inherent within
contemporary incentives-to-industry programs, and thereby offer superior
solutions to the unemployment problems which now exist within the older,
American industrial centers.
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